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20 Abstract The  Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)  is an immune-inspired algorithm, developed for the 
21 purpose of anomaly  detection. The algorithm performs multi-sensor data  fusion and correlation  which 
22 results  in a ‘context  aware’  detection  system.  Previous  applications of the DCA  have  included  the 
23 detection  of potentially  malicious  port scanning  activity,  where  it  has  produced  high  rates  of true 
24 positives  and  low rates  of false positives.  In  this  work  we aim  to compare  the performance  of the 
25 DCA and of a Self-Organizing  Map (SOM) when applied  to the detection of SYN port scans, through 
26 experimental analysis.  A SOM is an ideal candidate for comparison  as it shares similarities with the 
27 DCA in terms of the data  fusion method employed. It is shown that the results of the two systems are 
28 comparable, and  both  produce  false positives  for the same processes.  This  shows that the DCA can 
29 produce  anomaly  detection results to the same standard as an established technique. 
30 
31 
Keywords Dendritic Cell Algorithm · Self-Organizing  Map · SYN scan detection · comparison 
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33 
34 1 Introduction 
35 
36 The  Dendritic  Cell Algorithm  (DCA)  is an  immune-inspired algorithm,  which is the latest addition 
37 to a family of algorithms termed Artificial Immune Systems (AIS). Such systems use abstract models 
38 of particular  components  of the human  immune  system  to produce  systems  which  perform  similar 
39 computational tasks to those seen in the human  body. Previous  approaches  drew inspiration from the 
40 adaptive immune system producing  algorithms such as clonal selection [14] and negative  selection [33]. 
41 The negative  selection approach  has been used extensively in the domain  of computer security specif- 
42 ically in the detection of potential intrusions [44]. Such systems enjoyed initial success, but have since 
43 been  plagued  with  problems  regarding  scalability  and  the generation  of excessive numbers  of false 
44 positive alerts. 
45 Aickelin et al. [1] proposed an alternative which suggests that successful AIS should be constructed 
46 using the ‘danger theory’ as inspiration. The danger theory suggests that the immune system responds 
47 to signals generated  by the host  cells (i.e. by the tissue)  during  cell stress,  ultimately  leading  to the 
48 targeting of proteins  present under the conditions of cell stress. It is a competing immunological theory, 
49 though it is still widely debated  within immunology itself. This theory is centred around  the detection 
50 of ‘danger signals’, which are released as a result of unplanned cell death,  a process termed necrosis. 
51 Upon the detection of danger  signals, the immune system can be activated. In the absence of necrosis, 
52 cells may die in a controlled manner  as part of the regulatory processes found within the tissue, in a 
53 
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2 process called apoptosis.  Dendritic cells (DCs)  are sensitive to both  signal types and  have the ability 
3 to stimulate or suppress  the adaptive immune  system. DCs are the intrusion detection agents of the 
4 human  immune system, policing the tissue for potential sources of damage  in the form of signals and 
5 for potential culprits responsible  for the damage  in the form of ‘antigen’. Antigens are proteins  which 
6 can be ‘presented’ to the adaptive immune system by DCs, and can belong to pathogens  or to the host 
7 itself. 
8 The DCA incorporates danger-based DC biology to form an algorithm that is both truly bio-inspired 
9 and  is capable  of performing  anomaly  detection.  It is a population based  algorithm,  where multiple 
10 DCs are programmed to process signals and antigen. ‘Signals’ are mapped  to context information, such 
11 as the behaviour  of a monitored, e.g. CPU  usage or network traffic statistics. ‘Antigens’ are mapped 
12 as potential causes for the changes in behaviour,  e.g. the system calls of a running  program.  The DCA 
13 correlates  the antigen  and  signal  information across  the population of cells to produce  a consensus 
14 coefficient value which is assessed to determine anomalous  antigen. 
15 The DCA has been successfully applied to a subset of intrusion detection problems, focussing on port 
16 scan detection. Port scans are used to establish network layout and to uncover vulnerable  computers. 
17 The  detection  of the scanning  phase  of an attack can be highly beneficial, as upon its  detection  the 
18 level of security  can be increased  across a network  in response.  The  DCA has been applied  to both 
19 ping scans and SYN scans in realtime and offline [27] [25]. The algorithm produced  high rates  of true 
20 positives and low rates  of false positives. 
21 While  the performance  of the DCA  on  these  problems  appears  to be  good,  thus  far  no  direct 
22 comparison  has  been  performed  with  another system  on the same  port scan  data.  The  need  for a 
23 rigorous  comparison  is necessary  to truly demonstrate  the capabilities  of this  algorithm.  The  signal 
24 processing  component  housed  within  the DCA  bears  some resemblance  to the function  of a neural 
25 network [13]. Given these superficial similarities, the obvious next-step for the development of the DCA 
26 is to compare its performance  to that of a neural network based system, such as a Self-Organizing Map 
27 (SOM) [47]. 
28 SOM is a clustering  method  of unsupervised  learning  where high dimensional  data  is mapped  to 
29 a lower dimensional  space to create  a feature  map.  This  map  is constructed  from training  data  and 
30 consists of a series of interconnected nodes. Upon the analysis of the test data,  the incoming data  items 
31 are matched  against  nodes in the map  with  similar  characteristics.  SOM uses a similar  process to a 
32 single-layer  neural  network  to generate  the map,  and  a simple distance  metric  is used to match  the 
33 incoming test data  to the most appropriate node. This  technique can be used for anomaly  detection 
34 as the training data  can consist of normal  data  items, with unclustered data  representing a potential 
35 anomaly.  SOM is an excellent choice for comparison  as it has a history of application within computer 
36 security and can be manipulated to use similar input data  as used with the DCA. 
37 The aim of this paper is to compare the DCA with a SOM. To achieve this aim the two algorithms 
38 are applied  to the detection of an outbound SYN-based  port scan using data  captured from previous 
39 real-time experiments performed  with the DCA [25]. The results of this comparison  indicate  that the 
40 DCA and SOM are both  equally as effective at detecting SYN based port scans, and appear  to make 
41 similar  false positive errors.  As a baseline  a k-means  clustering algorithm is applied  to the signals in 
42 isolation. 
43 This paper  is structured as follows. In Section 2, the relevant background  and context information 
44 is given regarding  problems  in computer  security  and  how these  problems  relate  to port scanning  in 
45 addition to a summary  of current port scanning techniques. In Sections 3 and 4, descriptions are given 
46 of the DCA and  SOM respectively,  including  details  of their  implementations.  In Section  5, the two 
47 approaches  are compared  experimentally. In Section 6 we perform an analysis and comparison  between 
48 the two  systems  based  on the obtained  results  and  debate  their  differences and  similarities,  further 
49 validated by a baseline  series. In the final sections  we discuss  the results  of these  comparisons  and 
50 present the implications  for the future of the DCA. 
51 
52 
53 2 Related Work 
54 
55 2.1 Overview 
56 
57 As this paper encompasses  a variety of techniques and  concepts, this section is subdivided  into three 
58 parts. Firstly, the problems associated with port scans are described followed by a description of current 
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1 
2 scan detection techniques. This is followed by the related  computer security work in AIS, including the 
3 development of the DCA and  the motivation for its development. This  section continues with a brief 
4 overview of the use of various SOM algorithms in computer security. 
5 
6 
7 
8 2.2 Port Scanning  and Detection 
9 
10 2.2.1 Introduction to Port  Scanning 
11 
12 Insider  attacks  are  one  of the most  costly  and  dangerous  attacks  performed  against  computerised 
13 systems,  with  a large  amount  of known  intrusions  of intrusions  attributed to internal  attackers  [6]. 
14 This type of intrusion is defined through the attacker being a legitimate user of a system who behaves 
15 in an unauthorised  manner.  Such insider  attacks  have the potential  to cause major  disruption  given 
16 that a large number of networks do not employ internal firewalling with many security countermeasures 
17 focussing on the detection of external intruders. Insiders  frequently know and have access to network 
18 topology information. As insiders operate  from within an organisation, this provides them with scope 
19 to abuse a weak link in the security chain,  namely the end users. Having knowledge and relationships 
20 with  other  network  users  brings  with  it  the potential  to coerce passwords  from legitimate  users  for 
21 the purpose  of gaining access across multiple machines on a network. This information can be used to 
22 steal sensitive data,  to cause damage  to the network or to disguise the identity of the true attacker. 
23 Such attacks frequently involve multiple stages. The initial stage is the information gathering  stage, 
24 which is followed by monitoring  of potential  victims,  finally involving  an intrusion.  The  information 
25 gathering  stage involves scouting the network for potential victim host machines to suit the nature of 
26 the attack. For example, the insider may wish to exploit an FTP service and would therefore search the 
27 network  for hosts  running  FTP. Port scanning  is used in the information gathering  stage  to retrieve 
28 which  hosts  are  currently  running  on the network,  the IP  addresses  and  DNS names  of each  host, 
29 which ‘ports’ are currently ‘open’ and named  running  host services. 
30 It is wise for an attacker  to understand  the network  in question,  to avoid wasting  time  trying  to 
31 exploit machines which are not receptive to an attack. It is pointless attempting to attack a host which 
32 is no longer connected to the network! While scanners are not an ‘intrusion’ in the classical sense, they 
33 are  often  a pre-cursor  to an  actual  attack, and  evidence  of sufficient  scanning  across a network  can 
34 suggest that an attack may soon follow [39]. 
35 A port is a specific endpoint on a network, which is a virtual address as part of a virtual circuit. It is 
36 important to note that a port in this context is an abstract concept, not to be confused with a physical 
37 port such as a serial port. Ports allow for the direct exchange  of information between two hosts. It is 
38 similar to a telephone number and is more specific than an IP address as it provides a direct connection 
39 between two endpoints. Probing  a port with a packet leads to information  on the state of the port and 
40 its host. Ports can be in three states if the scanned  host is available,  namely  open, closed or filtered. 
41 Port scanning  tools such as nmap [17] can be used to send packets to various ports on remote  hosts to 
42 gain understanding regarding  the status of the scanned  host. The type of packet used to perform such 
43 probes can be one of a number  of types,  including  Internet Control  Message Protocol  (ICMP) ping, 
44 TCP,  and UDP.  According to Bailey-Lee et al. [4], TCP  SYN scans are the most commonly observed 
45 scan, accounting for over half of all scans performed. 
46 Additionally  the scans  themselves  can  be performed  in a number  of different  ways,  varying  the 
47 number  of hosts  scanned,  the number  of ports  scanned,  the IP  address  of the sender  and  the rate 
48 at  which packets  are  sent.  The  combination of the number  of hosts  (IP  addresses)  scanned  and  the 
49 number  of ports gives rise to three combinations of scan: 
50 
51 –  Horizontal  Scans:  A wide range  of IP  addresses  are  scanned,  though  only  one port per  host  is 
52 probed.  This  kind  of scan can be used if a particular  service is to be exploited,  such as an FTP 
53 exploit  whose success would depend  on finding a host  running  the particular  version  of an  FTP 
54 server/client. 
55 –  Vertical  Scans:  A range  of ports  are  specified for a single IP  address.  This  is a scan  of a single 
56 host,  where  multiple  services  can  be  searched  for.  Example  usage  of this  type  of scan  includes 
57 characterising a specific target such as a web server to assess if any exploitable services are currently 
58 running. 
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Fig. 1  The  TCP/IP packet flow for SYN scans under  various  conditions.
 
20 
21 –  Block Scans: This is a combination of both  types of scan, where multiple ports are probed across a 
22 range of IP addresses.  This search is especially good for uncovering  the topology of a network, for 
23 locating  servers, printers, client hosts etc. 
24 
25 A SYN scan, apart from being the most prevalent scan, can be used to retrieve a substantial amount 
26 
of information regarding  the status of a host or a network. SYN scans exploit the ‘3-way handshake’ 
27 
employed  by  the TCP  protocol.  The  3-way  handshake  describes  the specific manner  in  which  two 
28 
endpoints  communicate with  each other  and  is the initial  step  in opening  a TCP  data  stream.  For 
29 
example two hosts are connected to one another via a switched ethernet, host A and host B. To initiate 
30 
TCP  connections between A and B, A sends a TCP  SYN (synchronisation) packet to B. Provided  that 
31 B can receive such TCP  packets, B sends a SYN/ACK  (synchronisation/acknowledgement) packet to 
32 
A in response to the initial SYN request. Host A then replies with ACK packets which are sent until 
33 
all data  in the transmission stream is transferred. Upon completion, A sends B a FIN (finish) packet, 
34 
signalling that the data  transfer is complete. Port scans based on TCP  SYN packets exploit a flaw in 
35 
this 3-way connection method. 
36 
Instead  of  completing  the 3-way  handshake   of  ‘SYN,  SYN/ACK,   ACK’,  upon  receipt  of  the 
37 
SYN/ACK  packet,  the scanning  host  does not  send  an  ACK  packet  in response:  depending  on the 
38 
initial response of remote host B depends on how the scanning host behaves. The various responses to 
39 SYN requests are depicted in Figure  1. 
40 
In  the case of a  host  with  an  open  port, the victim  sends  the attacker  a  SYN/ACK  packet  in 
41 
response to the original SYN request. Instead of the attacker responding  back with an ACK packet, a 
42 RST packet is sent instead. This leaves the TCP  connection ‘half open’. As the conversation  remains 
43 
incomplete, it does not appear in system logs, making the SYN scan stealthy. Should the scanned victim 
44 
host have no open ports the attacker receives a RST packet. This however, informs the attacker that a 
45 host is connected to an IP address.  If no host is associated  with a scanned  IP address,  the connection 
46 
will time out on the attackers machine,  or the attacker will receive a “destination unreachable error” 
47 
from an interim router or firewall. 
48 
49 2.2.2 Port  Scan Detection 
50 
51 Port scan detection components are frequently integrated with commercial intrusion detection systems 
52 such as Snort [62]. The  detection method used involves generating  an ‘alert’ upon receiving ‘X ’ con- 
53 nections  within  ‘Y ’  seconds  from host  IP  address  ‘Z ’. There  are  three  problems  with  this  method. 
54 Firstly,  the majority  of port scanners  are  equipped  with  the facility  to fake the IP  address,  often 
55 called spoofing, of the source machine,  rendering  Z  unreliable.  Secondly most  scanners  allow for the 
56 randomisation of the duration between the sending of individual  packets, including slowing the rate  of 
57 sending to avoid detection. This makes the detection of the scan difficult if Y  is defined as a constant 
58 value. Finally,  should the port scan detector be host based, the performance  of a detector in response 
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1 
2 to an incoming scan will be impaired  for the detection of horizontal scans, as only a single connection 
3 is made to each host. This problem can be overcome through the detection of outbound port scans, as 
4 per extrusion detection [6]. 
5 To  overcome some of these  problems  a handful  of systems  are  developed  as dedicated  port scan 
6 detectors. For example  ‘Spice’ developed by Staniford et al. [68] incorporates an anomaly  probability 
7 score to dynamically  adjust the duration of Y . This is useful for the detection of stealthier scans which 
8 use randomised  or slowed rates  of scan  packets  sending.  This  detection  technique  is termed  reverse 
9 sequential  hypothesis  testing.  It is used  to further  extent  in research  performed  by Jung et  al. [39], 
10 where  it  is combined  with  a  network  based  approach  and  is used  to identify  potentially  malicious 
11 remote  hosts in addition to detecting scanning  activity. 
12 In our previous  research,  the DCA is applied  to the detection of various  port scans. The  DCA is 
13 implemented as a host based system monitor, detecting the performance  of an outbound port scan, in 
14 attempt overcome some of the problems with using static time windows. Initially the DCA is applied to 
15 the detection of simple ICMP ping scans [29], where the algorithm was used in real-time and produced 
16 high rates  of true positives and low rates  of false positives. 
17 In addition,  DCA is used in the detection  of a standard SYN scans,  also in a real-time  environ- 
18 ment  [27].  The  results  of this  study  show  that the DCA  shows  promise  as  a  successful  port scan 
19 detector. However the results presented were preliminary and as the experiments were performed  ‘live’ 
20 in real-time, certain sensitivity could not be performed.  Therefore,  it is necessary  to take this investi- 
21 gation  further and explore this application with more rigour. The experiments described  in this paper 
22 are extension experiments from the SYN scan data  used in Greensmith and Aickelin [25]. 
23 
24 
25 2.3 Artificial Immune Systems and Security 
26 
27 2.3.1 Immunity by Design 
28 
29 Numerous  computer security approaches  are based on the principles  of anomaly  detection.   This tech- 
30 nique involves producing  a profile of normal  host behaviour,  with any significant deviation  from this 
31 profile presumed  to be malicious or anomalous.  Various  AIS have been applied  as anomaly  detection 
32 algorithms within the field of computer security, given the obvious parallel of fighting computer viruses 
33 with a computer immune system [18]. The research  of AIS in security has extended past the detection 
34 of viruses and has focussed on network intrusion detection [45]. 
35 The AIS algorithms used in security are generally based on the principles  of “self-nonself discrimi- 
36 nation”. This  is an immunological  concept that the body has the ability to discriminate between self 
37 and nonself (i.e. foreign) protein  molecules, termed antigen. The natural mechanism  by which the body 
38 learns  this  discrimination is termed  negative  selection.  In this  process,  self-reactive  immune  cells are 
39 deleted during a ‘training period’ in embryonic development and infancy. This results in a tuned popu- 
40 lation of cells, poised to react against any threat which is deemed nonself. These principles are used to 
41 underpin  the supervised  negative  selection algorithm. Negative  selection itself is described  eloquently 
42 in a number  of sources  including  the work  of Hofmeyr  and  Forrest  [32], Ji and  Dasgupta  [37] and 
43 Balthrop et al. [5]. 
44 Following  its  initial  success in the detection  of system  call anomalies  [32], the negative  selection 
45 approach  was applied to the detection of anomalous network connections [44], where potential problems 
46 with  scaling  and  excessive false positive  rates  were uncovered.  These  empirical  studies  suggest  that 
47 negative  selection might not  be a suitable algorithm for use in computer security, with these notions 
48 confirmed by the theoretical work performed  by Stibor et al. [69]. Further analysis  performed  by the 
49 same authors has given insights into the theoretical reasons for negative  selection’s problems [70], with 
50 more evidence presented recently by Stibor et al. in [71]. 
 
52 
53 2.3.2 The Danger Project:  The Missing Link? 
54 
55 The  criticisms  of negative  selection  have  to some degree overwhelmed  the positive  aspects  of its  de- 
56 velopment and have in some respect discredited the use of AIS in security [66]. Issues such as scaling 
57 cannot  be ignored, especially as anomaly  detection is often required  to be performed  in real-time. The 
58 theoretical proofs of these problems are evident and duly noted  by the wider AIS community [72].The 
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1 
2 question of how to overcome these problems remains  at the forefront of AIS research,  focussing on the 
3 incorporation of more advanced  immunology. 
4 An interdisciplinary approach  is presented by Aickelin et al. [1], developed in 2003 through the Dan- 
5 ger Project. Aickelin et al. believe that some of the problems shown with negative selection approaches 
6 can  be attributed to its  biological  naivety.  It is recognised  that the negative  selection  algorithm  is 
7 based on a naive model of central tolerance developed in the 1950s [12]. 
8 Aickelin et al. propose  that through  close collaboration  with  immunologists,  computer  scientists 
9 will be able to develop more biologically realistic AIS which could potentially overcome the problems 
10 of false positives  and  scaling observed  with  negative  selection  [1]. The  DCA  is developed  using this 
11 interdisciplinary approach  [26], drawing  inspiration from DCs as it is now widely accepted that these 
12 cells are a major  control unit in the human  immune system. 
13 The  Danger  Project  brought  innate  immunology  in to the AIS spotlight,  as the innate  immune 
14 system is shown as responsible  for the initial pathogen  detection [52]. From this emerged two streams 
15 of research  which were based  on innate  principles,  the Dendritic  Cell Algorithm  and  the libtissue 
16 system and its related  algorithms [73]. The DCA will be explained  in detail in Section 3, and is based 
17 on  an  abstract model  of the behaviour  of natural DCs.  The  libtissue  system  is an  innate  immune 
18 framework  implemented as an API (application programming interface) [75]. 
19 
20 
21 
2.3.3 Summary
 
22 
23 
AIS have been used within computer security for over a decade. Despite its initial success, the negative 
24 
selection algorithm was not as useful as first thought due to problems with scaling and the generation 
25 
of excessive amounts of false positives. These negative  aspects have been shown both theoretically and 
26 
experimentally.  To remedy  this  problem,  the research  proposed  by Aickelin et al. [1] developed  into 
27 
the DCA and the libtissue framework,  both  of which have shown promise in the areas of port scan 
28 
and exploit detection respectively.
 
29 
30 
31 
2.4 SOM and Security
 
32 
33 
The Self-Organizing Map algorithm was developed by Teuvo Kohonen more than two decades ago [46], 
34 
yet its success in various  fields of science, over the years,  surpasses  many other  neural  inspired  algo- 
35 
rithms  to date.  The  algorithm’s  strengths  lie in a number  of important  scientific  domains.  Namely 
36 
visualisation, clustering, data  processing,  reduction and  classification.  In more specific terms SOM is 
37 
an  unsupervised  learning  algorithm  that is based  on the competitive  learning  mechanism  with  self- 
38 
organizing  properties.  Besides  its  clustering  properties  SOM  can  also  be  classed  as  a  method  for 
39 
multidimensional scaling and projection. 
40 
SOM algorithms  have been first  applied  to computer  security  applications  almost  ten years  after 
41 
the algorithm’s  inception  [19]. The  majority  of existing  research  however  is limited  to anomaly  de- 
42 
tection, particularly network based  intrusion detection [16]. Some work has been done on host based 
43 
anomaly  detection  using  Kohonen’s  algorithm,  however  such  work  is rare  [35], which  is surprising, 
44 
due  to the algorithms  suitability  to handle  multidimensional,  thus  multi-signal  data.  On  numerous 
45 
occasions SOM algorithms have been used as a pre-processor  to other computational intelligence tools, 
46 
such as Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [11] [10] [43] or Radial  Basis Function Networks [36]. Compar- 
47 
isons of SOM algorithms with other  anomaly  detection approaches  have been performed  on numerous 
48 
occasions  in the past. Notably  a comparison  with  HMM [76], AIS [21] [22],  traditional  neural  net- 
49 
works [63] [50] [38] [49] [8], k-means clustering [42] as well as Adaptive Resonance  Theory  [3].
 
50 
51 2.4.1 SOM in Intrusion Detection 
52 
53 Besides the above mentioned comparisons  of SOM algorithms with various computational intelligence 
54 techniques, here we will describe the use of SOM algorithms in areas related  to our comparison  or that 
55 could be of interest to the general reader. 
56 A seminal paper on the use of SOM algorithms for intrusion detection was presented by Ramadas 
57 et al. [59]. Their  work employed  the original  SOM algorithm  as a network  based  anomaly  detection 
58 module  for a larger  IDS. Besides being able to monitor  all types  of network  traffic  including  SMTP 
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1 
2 protocol  (email),  the authors  state that the SOM algorithm  is particularly  suitable  to detect  buffer- 
3 overflow attacks. However, as with the majority of anomaly  detection systems, the algorithm struggles 
4 to recognise attacks which resemble normal  behaviour  in addition to boundary  case behaviour,  giving 
5 rise to false positives. 
6 Buffer  overflow [20]  attack detection  was  also  tackled  by  Rhodes  [60]  using  a  multilayer  SOM, 
7 monitoring payloads.  Bolzoni [9] also looked at  payload  monitoring using SOM by employing  a two- 
8 tier architecture system. 
9 Gonzalez  and  Dasgupta  [21] compared  SOM against  another AIS algorithm.  Their  Real-Valued 
10 Negative Selection algorithm is based on the original Negative Selection algorithm proposed by Forrest 
11 et al. [18] with the difference of using a new representation. The original Negative Selection algorithm 
12 has been applied to Intrusion Detection problems in the past and has received some criticism regarding 
13 its “scaling problems”  [44]. Gonzalez and Dasgupta argue that their new representation is the key to 
14 avoiding  the scaling  issues of the original  algorithm.  Their  results  showed  that for their  particular 
15 problem  the SOM algorithm and their own algorithm were comparable  overall. 
16 Albarayak et al. [2] proposed  a unique  way of combining  a number  of existing  SOM approaches 
17 together  in a node  based  IDS. Their  thesis  is of automatically  determining  the most  suitable  SOM 
18 algorithm for each node within their system. Such a decision can be achieved using heuristic rules that 
19 determine a suitable SOM algorithm based on the nodes environment. 
20 Miller and Inoue [55] suggested using multiple intelligent agents, each of which contains a SOM on 
21 its own. Such agents combine a signature  and  anomaly  based detection technique in order to achieve 
22 a collaborative  IDS, which is able to improve  its detection capabilities with the use of reinforcement 
23 learning. 
24 DeLooze [15] employed an ensemble of SOM networks for the purpose of an IDS as well as for attack 
25 characterisation. Genetic algorithms were used for attack type generation, subsequently employed  as 
26 part of an IDS that is able to discriminate the type of attack that has occurred. 
27 SOM algorithms  have  also been used for the analysis  of executables.  Yoo [78] analysed  windows 
28 executables  by creating  maps  of EXE  files before and  after  an infection  by a virus.  Such maps  have 
29 been subsequently  analysed  visually  and  found to have contained  patterns,  which can be thought  of 
30 as virus masks.  The  author concludes by stating that such masks can be used in the future for virus 
31 detection in a similar manner  to current anti-virus techniques. The difference being that a single mask 
32 could detect viruses from a whole virus family rather than being able to find only a single variant. 
33 Besides the original single network SOM algorithm, the previously described newer SOM variations 
34 were employed  for various  security research  scenarios.  A number  of papers  discuss the advantages of 
35 using multiple or hierarchical  SOM networks in contrast to a single network SOM. These include the 
36 work  of Sarasamma et  al. [64], Lichodzijewski  et  al. [51] and  Kayacik  et  al. [41] [30] who all used 
37 various  versions  of the Hierarchical  SOM  or  employed  multiple  SOM  networks  for the purpose  of 
38 intrusion  detection.  Kayacik  et  al. [41] state that the best  performance  is achieved  using  a 2-layer 
39 SOM and that their results are by far the best of any unsupervised  learning based IDS to date. 
40 
41 
42 2.4.2 Visualisation using SOM in IDS 
43 
44 Due to the SOM algorithm’s capability of visualising multidimensional data  in a meaningful way, its use 
45 lends itself ideally to its application in visualising computer security problems.  Gonzalez et al. [23] use 
46 this ability to visualise the self non-self space that they use for anomaly  detection. This visualisation 
47 presents a clear discrimination of the different behaviours  of the monitored system. Hoglund et al. [34] 
48 on the other  hand  employed  visualisation of user behaviour.  In their work various  host based  signals 
49 were used for monitoring of users. A visual representation was subsequently presented to administrators 
50 
in order for them to be able to make an informed decision in case of unacceptable user behaviour. 
51 
52 
53 3 The Dendritic  Cell Algorithm 
54 
55 3.1 Natural DCs 
56 
57 The  DCA  is based  on the observed  functions  of natural dendritic  cells. DCs  are  natural intrusion 
58 detection agents, who monitor the host tissue for evidence of damage.  In the human  body, DCs have a 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8 
 
1 
2 dual  role, as garbage  collectors for tissue debris  and  as commanders  of the adaptive immune system. 
3 DCs belong to the innate  immune system, and do not have the adaptive capability of the lymphocytes 
4 of the adaptive  immune  system.  DCs exist  in three  states  of differentiation,  immature, semi-mature 
5 and  mature,  which determines their exact function [52]. Modulations between the different states are 
6 dependent  upon the receipt  of signals while in the initial  or immature state. Signals which indicate 
7 damage  cause  a  transition  from  immature to mature. Those  signals  indicating   good  health  in  the 
8 monitored tissue cause a transition from immature to semi mature. The signals in question are derived 
9 from numerous  sources, including  pathogens, from healthy dying cells, from damaged  cells and  from 
10 inflammation. Each  DC  has  the capability  to combine  the relative  proportions  of input signals  to 
11 produce  its own set of output signals. Input signals processed  by DCs are categorised  based  on their 
12 origin: 
13 
14 
PAMPs:   Pathogenic associated   molecular  patterns are  proteins   expressed  exclusively  by  bacteria, 
15 
which  can  be  detected  by  DCs  and  result  in  immune  activation  [56].  The  presence  of PAMPS 
16 
usually indicates  an anomalous  situation. 
17 
Danger  signals:  Signals produced  as a result  of unplanned necrotic  cell death.  On damage  to a cell, 
18 
the chaotic breakdown  of internal components form danger signals which accumulate in tissue [53]. 
19 
DCs are sensitive  to changes  in danger  signal concentration.  The  presence  of danger  signals may 
20 
or may not indicate  an anomalous  situation, however the probability of an anomaly  is higher than 
21 
under  normal  circumstances. 
22 
Safe signals:  Signals  produced  via  the process  of normal  cell death,   namely  apoptosis.  Cells  must 
23 
apoptose for regulatory reasons, and the tightly controlled process results in the release of various 
24 
signals into the tissue [54]. These ‘safe signals’ result in immune suppression.  The presence of safe 
25 
signals almost certainly indicate  that no anomalies  are present. 
26 
Inflammation: Various immune-stimulating molecules can be released as a result of injury.  Inflamma- 
27 
tory signals and the process of inflammation is not enough to stimulate DCs alone, but can amplify 
28 
the effects of the other three categories of signal [67]. It is not possible to say whether an anomaly is 
29 
more or less likely if inflammatory signals are present. However, their presence amplifies the above 
30 
three signals.
 
31 Dendritic cells act as natural data  fusion agents, producing  various  output signals in response  to 
32 the receipt  of differing combinations of input signal.  The  relative  concentration  of output signal  is 
33 used  to determine  the exact  state of differentiation,  expressed  by  the production  of two  molecules, 
34 namely  the mature and  semi-mature output signals.  During  this  phase  they  are  exposed  to varying 
35 concentrations  of the input signals.  Exposure  to PAMPs,  danger  signals and  safe signals causes the 
36 increased production of costimulatory molecules, and a resulting removal from the tissue and migration 
37 to a local lymph node. 
38 DCs translate the signal information received in the tissue into a context for antigen presentation, 
39 i.e. the antigen presented in an overall ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’ context. The antigen collected while in 
40 the immature phase is expressed on the surface of the DC. Whilst in the lymph node, DCs seek out T- 
41 lymphocytes (T-cells) and attempt to bind expressed antigen with the T-cells variable  region receptor. 
42 T-cells with  a high enough  affinity  for the presented  antigen  are influenced  by the output signals of 
43 the DC.  DCs exposed  to predominantly  PAMPs  and  danger  signals are  termed  ‘mature  DCs’;  they 
44 produce  mature output signals, which activate the bound  T-cells. Conversely, if the DC is exposed to 
45 predominantly safe signals the cell is termed semi-mature and antigens are presented in a safe context, 
46 as little damage is evident when the antigen is collected. The balance between the signals is translated 
47 via the signal processing and correlation  ability of these cells. The overall immune system response is 
48 based  on the systemic  maturation state average  of the whole DC population on a per antigen  basis. 
49 An abstract view of this process is presented in Figure  2. 
50 
51 
52 3.2 Algorithm Overview 
53 
54 The purpose  of the DCA is to correlate  disparate data-streams in the form of antigen and signals and 
55 to label groups  of identical  antigen  as ‘normal’  or ‘anomalous’.  This  algorithm  is population based 
56 with each ‘cell’ expressed as an ‘agent’. The DCA is not only a classification  algorithm, it also shares 
57 properties with certain filtering techniques. It provides information representing how anomalous a group 
58 of antigens  are,  not  simply  if a data  item  is anomalous  or not.  This  is achieved  through  correlating 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 24
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Immature
 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
-collect antigen
 
-receive signals 
12 -in tissue 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safe Signals 
 
 
 
Danger Signals 
PAMPS 
9 
 
 
 
Semi-mature 
 
 
 
 
-present  antigen 
-produce  costimulation 
-provide tolerance cytokines 
-in lymph node 
 
Mature 
 
 
 
 
-present  antigen 
-produce  costimulation 
-provide reactive cytokines 
-in lymph node 
Fig. 2  An abstract view of DC maturation and  signals required for differentiation where cytokines are molec- 
19 ular  messengers  between immune  system cells. 
20 
21 Table 1  Table  of cumulative output signals  and  their associated implications for the DCA. 
22 
23 
Output signal  Function 
CSM signal  assessed  against a threshold to limit the duration 
of DC  signal  and  antigen  sampling, based  on  a 
25 migration threshold 
26 Semi-mature signal  terminal  state to semi-mature  if greater  than re- 
27 
sultant mature signal value 
28 
Mature signal  terminal state to mature if greater than resultant 
29 
semi-mature signal value
 
30 
31 
32 a time-series  of input signals with  a group  of antigen.  The  signals used are pre-normalised and  pre- 
33 categorised data  sources, which reflect the behaviour  of the system being monitored. The co-occurrence 
34 of antigen and high/low signal values forms the basis of categorisation for the antigen data.  The primary 
35 components of a DC based algorithm are as follows: 
36 1.  Individual  DCs with the capability to perform multi-signal processing; 
37 2.  Antigen collection and presentation; 
38 3.  Sampling  behaviour  and state changes; 
39 4.  A population of DCs and their interactions with signals and antigen; 
40 5.  Incoming signals and antigen, with signals pre-categorised as PAMP,  danger,  safe or inflammation; 
41 6.  Multiple antigen presentation and analysis  using ‘types’ of antigen; 
42 7.  Generation of anomaly  coefficient for various different types of antigen. 
43 
44 Whilst in the immature state, the DC has three functions, which are performed  each time a single 
45 DC is updated,  with the exact nature of this processing given in Section 3.4: 
46 1.  Sample  antigen:  the DC collects  antigen  from an  external  source (in  our case, from the ‘tissue’) 
47 and places the antigen in its own antigen storage data  structure. 
48 2.  Update input  signals: the DC collects values of all input signals present in the signal storage area. 
49 3.  Calculate  interim   output  signals: at  each  iteration  each  DC  calculates  three  temporary  output 
50 signal values from the received input signals, with the output values then added  to form the cell’s 
51 cumulative output signals. 
52 
53 The signal processing used to transform the input to interim output signals is shown in Figure  3, 
54 with the implications  of each output signal given in Table  1. Costimulatory molecule (CSM) signal is 
55 used to limit the sampling  duration of an individual  cell. Each cell is assigned a migration  threshold 
56 value  upon  creation.  The  CSM values  are  incremented  each time  a cell receives signal  input. Once 
57 the CSM exceeds the cell’s migration  threshold the cell is removed  from the sampling  population for 
58 analysis.  Different  cells sample  for different  durations as  each  cell is assigned  a  random  migration 
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Fig. 3  A  representation  of the three  calculations  performed by  each  DC,  per  update  cycle,  to  derive  the 
cell’s outputs through fusing together the signal inputs. Two sample  notations for the weights are shown. The 
19 inflammation signal (if any)  applies  to all transformations shown and  is therefore not depicted. Details of the 
20 notation are given in Section 3.4. 
21 
22 
23 
threshold value (within a range  to match  the normalised  range  of the input signals).  This  leads to a 
24 ‘time-window’ effect which adds robustness to the algorithm, as the migration  is signal dependent with 
25 
no fixed time dependency.  During periods where signal values are large the rate  of migration  is higher 
26 
and therefore tighter coupling is given to the signal and  antigen data.  This effect is explored  in more 
27 detail in Oates  et al. [58] where a theoretical analysis  is provided. 
28 
Upon transition to a matured state, the DCs output signals are assessed to form the context of all 
29 
antigen collected. A higher  ’mature’ output signal value results in the assignment of a context value 
30 of 1 to the DC,  whereas  a higher  ‘semi-mature’  output signal  value  results  in a context  value  of 0. 
31 
All antigen  sampled  by  the DC  over its  lifetime  are  output with  the assigned  context  value.  Upon 
32 
completion of all data  processing  the mean  context in which the antigens are presented is calculated 
33 
deriving an anomaly coefficient value per antigen type. Each antigen (suspect data  item) is not unique, 
34 
but several identical antigens are sampled. The mature  context  antigen value - MCAV, is used to assess 
35 
is a particular antigen type is anomalous.  The  derivation of the MCAV per antigen type is shown in 
36 Equation 1, 
37 Zx
 
38 M C AVx  = 
39 
Yx 
(1) 
40 where M C AVx   is the MCAV coefficient  for antigen  type  x, Zx   is the number  of mature context 
41 antigen presentations for antigen type x and  Yx  is the total number  of antigen presented for antigen 
42 type x. 
43 The  effectiveness  of the MCAV is dependent  upon the use of antigen  types.  This  means  that the 
44 input antigens  are  not  unique  in value,  but belong to a population in themselves.  For  example,  the 
45 ID value  of a running  program  is used to form antigen,  with  each antigen  generated  every time  the 
46 program  sends an instruction to the low level system. Therefore  a population of antigen is used, linked 
47 to the activity of the program  and all bearing  the same ID number. 
48 To process signals, antigens and  cells the DCA uses two virtual compartments: tissue and  lymph 
49 nodes. The  tissue  is used as storage  for antigens  and  signals and  the lymph  node is used for MCAV 
50 generation. The tissue consists of antigen and signal containers from which the DCs sample the input 
51 data.  Signals are updated  at regular  intervals and are not removed upon sampling  by a DC. Antigens 
52 are input in an event-driven manner  and are removed from the tissue antigen store upon sampling  by 
53 a DC. 
54 We suggest  that the updates  of antigen,  signals and  cells are performed  independently,  based  on 
55 previous  experience with this algorithm. This  is represented in Figure  4. The three updates  need not 
56 occur  simultaneously:  this  temporal  correlation  between  asynchronously arriving  data  is performed 
57 by the processing  of the cells themselves.  The  population dynamics  are  used  to perform  the actual 
58 anomaly  detection.  The  ultimate  classification  of a particular  type  of antigen  is derived  not  from a 
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14 Fig. 4  A UML overview of the processes at the tissue level of the program, showing the asynchronous update 
15 
of cells,  signals  and  antigen.  It  also  shows  the two  main  stages  of update  and  initialisation  and  subsequent 
16 
analysis.
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27 Fig. 5  Architecture used to support the DCA.  Input data is processes via signal and  antigen clients [75]. The 
28 algorithm utilises  this data and  resides  on a server. 
29 
30 
31 single DC, but from an aggregate  analysis produced  across the DC population over the duration of an 
32 experiment. 
33 
34 
35 3.3 libtissue 
36 
37 The Danger Project [1] has produced a variety of research outcomes alongside the DCA. Such outcomes 
38 include the development of danger theory and DC based immunology [77]; a framework for developing 
39 immune inspired  algorithms called libtissue [75]; an investigation into the interactions between the 
40 innate  and  adaptive immune system; artificial tissue [7] and  the application of a naive version of the 
41 DCA for the security  of sensor networks.  libtissue is the API  used within  the Danger  Project  for 
42 the testing  of ideas and  algorithms,  as shown in the works of Twycross  [73] [75] and  Greensmith  et 
43 al. [28] [29]. 
44 libtissue is a library  implemented in C which assists the development of immune inspired  algo- 
45 rithms  on real-world  data. It is based  on principles  of innate  immunology  [74] [75], through  the use 
46 of techniques  from modelling,  simulation  and  artificial  life. It allows researchers  to implement  algo- 
47 rithms  as a collection  of cells, antigen  and  signals,  interacting  within  a specified compartment.  The 
48 implementation has a client/server architecture which separates data  collection using clients, from data 
49 processing on a server, as shown in Figure  5. 
50 Input data  is processed using libtissue clients, which transform raw data into antigen and signals. 
51 Algorithms can be implemented within the libtissue server, as it provides all the required components 
52 such as the ability to define different cell types, specifying receptors, compartments and internal signals. 
53 Antigen  and  signal  sources  can  be added  to libtissue servers,  facilitating  the testing  of the same 
54 algorithm  with  a  number  of different  data  sources.  Input data  from  the client  are  passed  to and 
55 represented in a compartment contained on a server known as the tissue compartment. This is a space 
56 in which  cells, signals  and  antigen  interact.  Each  tissue  compartment  has  a fixed-size antigen  store 
57 where collected  antigens  are placed.  The  tissue  compartment  also stores  levels of signals,  set  by the 
58 input clients. 
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31 Fig. 6  Illustration of the DCA showing data input,  continuous sampling, the maturation process and aggregate 
32 analysis. 
33 
34 
35 3.4 DCA Implementation 
36 
37 The DCA is implemented as a libtissue server. Input signals are combined with antigen data,  such 
38 as a program  ID number. This is achieved through using the population of artificial DCs to perform ag- 
39 gregate sampling and data  processing. Using multiple DCs means that multiple data  items in the form 
40 of antigen are sampled multiple times.  If a single DC presents incorrect information, it becomes incon- 
41 sequential provided that the majority of the DCs population derive the correct cell context represented 
42 as the MCAV coefficient. 
43 The  DCA  has  two  main  stages:  initialisation, and  update.  Initialisation  involves  setting  various 
44 parameters  and  is followed by  the update  stage.  The  update  stage  can  be  decomposed  into  tissue 
45 update and  cell cycle. Signal data  is fed from the data-source to the tissue  server through  the tissue 
46 client  and  is updated  at  a user  defined  rate.  The  cell cycle involves  the regular  update  of the DC 
47 population. Following the processing of all data,  the MCAV coefficients are calculated  for each antigen 
48 type. An overview of this is given in Figure  6. 
49 The  tissue  update  is a continuous  process,  whereby  the values  of the tissue  data  structures  are 
50 refreshed.  In this  implementation,  signals are updated  at  regular  intervals  - in our case, this  is at  a 
51 rate  of once per second.  The  update  of antigen  occurs on an  event-driven  basis,  with  antigen  items 
52 updated  in the tissue each time new raw data  appears  in the system. The updated  signals provide the 
53 input signals for the population of DCs. 
54 The  cell cycle is a  discrete  process  occurring  at  a  user  defined  rate  of once per  second  in  this 
55 research.  Signals and antigen from the tissue data  structures are accessed by the DCs during  the cell 
56 cycle. This  includes  an  update  of every DC in the system  with  new signal values  and  antigen.  The 
57 new values are processed and accumulated as the output vector of signals is generated. The cell cycle 
58 and  update  of tissue continues until a stopping criterion is reached.  Finally,  the aggregation  stage is 
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1 
2 initiated, where all collected antigens are subsequently analysed  and  the MCAV per antigen derived. 
3 This procedure  forms the required  post-processing for use with this algorithm. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.5 Parameters and Structures
 
8 
9 
The algorithm is described  formally using the following terms.
 
10 –  Indices: 
11 i = 0, ..., I input signal index; 
12 j = 0, ..., J input signal category  index; 
13 k = 0, ..., K  tissue antigen index; 
14 l = 0, ..., L DC cycle index; 
15 m = 0, ..., M  DC index; 
16 n = 0, ..., N  DC antigen index; 
17 p = 0, ..., P  DC output signal index. 
18 
19 –  Parameters: 
20 I = number  of input signals per category  (e.g. PAMP,  Danger,  Safe); 
21 J = number  of categories  of input signal; 
22 K  = number  of antigen in tissue antigen vector; 
23 L = number  of DC cycles; 
24 M  = number  of DCs in population; 
25 N  = DC antigen vector size ; 
26 P  = number  of output signals per DC; 
27 Q = number  of antigens sampled  per DC, per cycle; 
28 R = number  of DC antigen receptors; 
29 Tmax  = tissue antigen vector size. 
30 
31 –  Data  Structures: 
32 T = {S, A} - the tissue; 
33 S = tissue signal matrix; 
34 sij = a signal index i, category  j in the signal matrix  S; 
35 A = tissue antigen vector; 
36 ak   = antigen k in the tissue antigen vector; 
37 DCm ={s(m), a(m), o‾p (m), tm }- a DC within the population; 
38 s(m)  = signal matrix  of DCm ; 
39 a(m)  = antigen vector of DCm ; 
40 op (m)  = output signal p of DCm ; 
41 o‾p (m)  = cumulative output signal p of DCm ; 
42 tm  = migration  threshold of DCm ; 
43 wijp  = transforming weight from sij to op . 
44 
45 
46 
47 op (m) = 
X X 
wijp sij (m)  Vp (2) 
48 i 
49 
j=3 
50 Each DCm  transforms each value of s(m)  to op (m).  In Equation 2, a specific example is given for 
51 use with four input signals, with one signal per category  and consists of some additional components. 
52 Additionally,  the j = 3 component  implies that signal category  index is not  summed  with  the other 
53 three  signal  categories  i.e. inflammation is not  treated in the same  manner  as the other  signals,  as 
54 shown  in  this  equation.   The  interrelationships  between  the weights,  determined  through  practical 
55 immunology,  are shown in Table  2. 
56 The  tissue has containers for signal and  antigen values,  namely  S and  A. In this example  version 
57 of the DCA,  there  are four categories  of signal (J = 3) and  one signal per category  (I = 0). In this 
58 instantiation s0,0 = PAMP  signals, s0,1 = danger signals and s0,2 = safe signals and s0,3 = inflammation. 
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1 
2 Table 2  Derivation and  interrelationship between weights in the signal processing  equation, where the values 
3 of the PAMP weights are  used  to create all other weights relative to the PAMP weight.  W 1 is the  weight  to 
4 transform the PAMP signal to the CSM output signal and  W 2 is the weight to transform the PAMP signal to 
5 
the mature output signal.
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 An antigen  store  is constructed  for use within  the tissue  cycle where all DCs in the population can 
15 collect antigen. 
16 The  cell update  component maintains all DC data  structures including  the DC population of set 
17 size M . Each DC has an input signal matrix, antigen vector, cumulative output signals and migration 
18 threshold. The internal values of DCm  are updated,  based on current data  in the tissue signal matrix 
19 and antigen vector. The DC input signals, s(m)  use the identical mapping  for signal categories as tissue 
20 s and  are updated  every cell cycle iteration.  Each  s(m)  for DCm   is updated  via an overwrite  every 
21 cell cycle. These  values are used to calculate  output signal values,  op(m) , for DCm , which are added 
22 cumulatively over a number  of cell cycles to form o‾p (m),  where p = 0 is costimulatory value, p = 1 is 
23 the semi-mature DC output signal and p = 2 is the mature DC output signal. With each cell update, 
24 DCs sample R antigens from the tissue antigen vector A. 
25 
26 
After the internal values of a DC are updated, o0  is assessed against tm  the cell’s migration  threshold. 
27 
If o0    is greater  than tm , the DC is ‘removed’  from the tissue.  Here, ‘remove’  means  that the DC is 
28 
de-allocated  the receptors  needed  to sample  the signal  matrix  and  to collect  antigen.  On  the next 
29 
update  cycle, the remaining  output signals are checked and the analysis  procedure  is initiated.
 
30 In this implementation, each DC is assigned a random  value for tm , within a specified range.  The 
31 random  value  adds  some diversity  to the DC  population. The  value  of o0    is increased  on exposure 
32 to any  signal  and  proportionately  to the strength  of the input signal.  By using  randomly  assigned 
33 migration  thresholds,  each DC samples  the signal matrix  a different  number  of times  throughout  its 
34 lifetime. Some exist for a short period sampling once or twice, others can persist for longer, dependent 
35 on the strength of the signals. This creates  a variable  time window effect for the sampling. 
36 Pseudocode  for this  specific instantiation  of the DCA  is given in Algorithm  1. This  pseudocode 
37 shows both  the update  of the tissue and  the individual  DCs. The  stages of the algorithm are shown, 
38 namely initialisation, update and analysis. While this provides the detail of the DC update mechanisms, 
39 this  pseudocode  does not  encapsulate the asynchronous  nature of the update  stages.  As libtissue 
40 is a multithreaded framework,  the three updates  are controlled by three different processes, therefore, 
41 the three  updates  occur  asynchronously. This  architecture  is particularly  suited  for real  time  data 
42 processing as updates  occur as and when they are required. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 3.6 Antigen Aggregation 
48 
49 
50 
Once DCm  has been removed from the population, the contents of a(m)  and values o‾p (m)  are logged 
51 
to a file for the aggregation  stage. Once completed, s(m),  a(m)  and  o‾p (m)  are all reset and  DCm  is 
52 
returned to the sampling  population. The  re-cycling of DCs continues until the stopping condition is 
53 
met (l = L). Once all data  has been processed  by the DCs, the output log of antigen-plus-context is 
54 
analysed.
 
55 The  same  antigen  is presented  multiple  times  with  different  context  values.  This  information is 
56 recorded  in a log file. The  total fraction  of mature DCs presenting  said  antigen  (where  o‾1    > o‾2 ) is 
57 divided  by the total amount of times the antigen was presented namely  o‾1 /(o‾1  + o‾2 ). This  is used to 
58 calculate  the mean MCAV. Equation 1 describes this process. 
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1 
2 input  : T = {S, A} 
3 output: a and  context 
4 create DCs; 
5 initialise parameters {I , J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q}; 
6 for l < L do 
7 
update A and  S; 
for m = 0 to M  do 
8 for n = 0 to Q do 
9 DCm   samples  Q antigen from A; 
10 end 
11 
for  i = 0 to I and j = 0 to J do 
12 
sDC = sij ; 
end 
for  n = 0 to N  do 
14 DCm   processes an (m); 
15 end 
16 
for p to P  do 
compute  op ; 
o‾p (m)  = o‾p (m) + op ; 
18 end 
19 if  o0 (m)  > tm  then 
20 DCm   removed  from population; 
21 
DCm   migrate, print antigen and  context; 
DCm   reset antigen vector and  all signals; 
end 
23 end 
24 l++; 
25 end 
26 analyse  antigen and  calculate MCAV 
27 Algorithm  1: Pseudocode  of the implemented DCA 
28 
29 
30 3.7 Signals and Antigen 
31 
32 An integral part of DC function is the ability to combine multiple signals to produce context informa- 
33 tion. The semantics of the different categories  of signal are derived  from the study of the influence of 
34 the different signals on DCs in vitro. Definitions of the characteristics of each signal category  are given 
35 below, with an example of an actual signal per category.  This categorisation forms the signal selection 
36 schema. Any number  of sources of information can be mapped  using the outlined principles. 
37 
38 
39 
–  PAMP  - si0 , e.g. the number of error messages generated per second by a failed network connection: 
40 
1.  a signature  of abnormal behaviour,  e.g. an error message; 
41 
2.  a high degree of confidence of abnormality associated  with an increase in this signal strength. 
42 
–  Danger  signal - si1 , e.g. the number  of transmitted network  packets per second: 
43 
1.  measure  of an attribute which significantly increases in response to abnormal behaviour; 
44 
2.  a moderate  degree of confidence of abnormality with increased level of this signal, though a low 
45 
signal strength can represent normal  behaviour. 
46 
–  Safe signal - si2  e.g. the inverse  rate  of change of number  of network  packets  per second.  A  high 
47 
rate of change equals a low safe signal level and vice versa: 
48 
1.  a  confident  indicator   of normal  behaviour  in  a  predictable  manner  or  a  measure  of steady- 
49 
behaviour; 
50 
2.  measure  of an  attribute which  increases  signal  concentration  due  to the lack  of change  in 
51 
strength.
 
52 
53 Signals, though  interesting,  are inconsequential  without  antigen.  To a DC, antigen  is an element 
54 which is carried  and presented to a T-cell, without regard  for the structure of the antigen. Antigen is 
55 the data  to be classified and  works well in the form of an identifier,  be it  an anomalous  process ID 
56 or the ID of a data  item [26]. At this stage, minimal  antigen processing is performed  and the antigen 
57 presented is an identical copy of the antigen collected. Detection is performed  through the correlation 
58 of antigen with fused signals. 
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1 
2 4 Self-Organizing Maps 
3 
4 4.1 Biological Inspiration for SOM 
5 
6 Various  properties  of the brain  were used as an inspiration for a large set of algorithms and  compu- 
7 tational theories known as neural  networks. Such algorithms have shown to be successful, however a 
8 vital  aspect  of biological neural  networks  was omitted  in the algorithm’s  development.  This  was the 
9 notion  of self-organization  and spatial  organization of information within the brain.  In 1981 Kohonen 
10 proposed a method which takes into account these two biological properties and presented them in his 
11 SOM algorithm [46]. 
12 The  SOM  algorithm  generates,  usually,  two  dimensional  maps  representing  a  scaled  version  of 
13 n-dimensional  data  used  as  the input to the algorithm.  These  maps  can  be thought  of as  “neural 
14 networks”  in the same  sense as SOM’s  traditional  rivals,  artificial  neural  networks  (ANNs).  This  is 
15 due to the algorithm’s  inspiration from the way that mammalian brains  are structured  and  operate 
16 in a data  reducing and self-organised fashion. Traditional ANNs originated  from the functionality and 
17 interoperability of neurons  within the brain.  The  SOM algorithm on the other  hand  was inspired  by 
18 the existence of many kinds of “maps”  within the brain  that represent spatially  organised  responses. 
19 An example from the biological domain  is the somatotopic map within the human  brain,  containing a 
20 representation of the body and its adjacent and topographically almost identical motor map responsible 
21 for the mediation  of muscle activity [47]. 
22 This spatial  arrangement is vital for the correct functioning of the central nervous system [40]. This 
23 is because similar types of information (usually sensory information) are held in close spatial  proximity 
24 to each other in order for successful information fusion to take place as well as to minimise the distance 
25 when neurons with similar tasks communicate. For example sensory information of the leg lies next to 
26 sensory information of the sole. 
27 The  fact  that similarities  in the input signals are converted  into  spatial  relationships among  the 
28 responding  neurons  provides  the brain  with  an  abstraction  ability  that suppresses  trivial  detail  and 
29 only maps most important properties and features  along the dimensions  of the brain’s map [61]. 
30 
31 
32 4.2 SOM Algorithm Overview 
33 
34 As the algorithm  represents  the above  described  functionality,  it  contains  numerous  methods  that 
35 achieve  properties  similar  to the biological  system.  The  SOM  algorithm  comprises  of competitive 
36 learning,  self-organization, multidimensional  scaling, global and  local ordering  of the generated  map 
37 and its adaptation. 
38 There  are two  high-level stages  of the algorithm  that ensure  a successful creation  of a map.  The 
39 first  stage  is the global ordering  stage  in which we start with  a map  of predefined  size with  neurons 
40 of random  nature and  using  competitive  learning  and  a method  of self-organization,  the algorithm 
41 produces  a rough  estimation  of the topography  of the map  based  on the input data.  Once a desired 
42 number  of input data  is used  for such  estimation,  the algorithm  proceeds  to the fine-tuning   stage, 
43 where  the effect  of the input data  on the topography  of the map  is monotonically  decreasing  with 
44 time, while individual  neurons and their close topological neighbours are sensitised and thus fine tuned 
45 to the present input. 
46 The  original  algorithm  developed  by Kohonen  comprises  of initialisation  followed by three  vital 
47 steps which are repeated  until a condition is met: 
48 
49 
–  Choice of stimulus 
50 
–  Response 
51 
–  Adaptation
 
52 Each of these steps are described  in detail in the next section. 
53 
54 
55 4.3 Algorithmic Detail and Implementation 
56 
57 A number  of existing  software  packages  that contain  an  implementation  of the SOM algorithm  are 
58 available,  however these are not ideal for some types of security research,  such as real-time detection, 
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1 
2 due to their limited speed and integratability. For this reason a C++ based implementation is developed 
3 according  to the original incremental SOM algorithm as described  by Kohonen [48]. In this section a 
4 detailed analysis  of the implemented algorithm and its step by step functional description follows. 
5 
6 
7 
4.3.1 Initialisation
 
8 
9 
A number  of parameters have to be chosen before the algorithm is to begin execution. These include 
10 
the size of the map,  its  shape,  the distance  measure  used  for comparing  how similar  nodes  are,  to 
11 
each other  and to the input feature  vectors, as well as the kernel function used for the training of the 
12 
map.  Kohonen  suggested  recommended  values  for these  parameters  [47], which are used throughout 
13 
our experiments. The values used in this paper are described in Section 5, found in Table 8. Once these 
14 
parameters are chosen, a map is created  of the predefined size, populated with nodes, each of which is 
15 
assigned a vector of random  values, wi , where i denotes  node to which vector w belongs. 
16 
17 4.3.2 Stimulus  Selection 
18 
19 The next step in the SOM algorithm is the selection of the stimulus that is to be used for the generation 
20 of the map.  This is done by randomly  selecting a subset of input feature  vectors from a training data 
21 set and presenting each input feature  vector, x, to the map,  one item per epoch. An epoch represents 
22 one complete computation of the three vital steps of the algorithm. 
23 
24 4.3.3 Response 
25 
26 At this stage the algorithm takes the presented input, x and compares  it against every node i within 
27 the map by means of a distance measure between x and each nodes’ weight vector wi . For example this 
28 can be the Euclidean  distance measure  shown in Equation 3, where ||.|| is the Euclidean  norm and wi 
29 is the weight vector of node i. This  way a winning node can be determined by finding a node within 
30 the map with the smallest Euclidean  distance from the presented vector x, here signified by c. 
31 
32 c = argmin{||x − wi ||} (3) 
33 
34 
35 
4.3.4 Adaptation
 
36 
37 
Adaptation is the step where the winning node is adjusted to be slightly more similar to the input x. 
38 
This is achieved by using a kernel function, such as the Gaussian  function (hci ) as seen in Equation 4 
39 
as part of a learning  process.
 
40
 
 
41 hci (t) = α(t).exp 
42 
||rc  − ri ||
2 
 
 
− 
2σ2 (t) 
 
(4) 
43 In  the above  function,  α(t) denotes  a  “learning-rate factor”  and  σ(t) denotes  the width  of the 
44 neighbourhood affected  by the Gaussian  function.  Both  of these  parameters  decrease  monotonically 
45 over time  (t). During  the first  1,000 steps,  α(t) should  have reasonably  high values (e.g. close to 1). 
46 This is called the global ordering  stage and is responsible for proper ordering  of wi . For the remaining 
47 steps,  α(t) should  attain reasonably  small values (≥ 0.2), as this is the fine-tuning  stage where only 
48 fine adjustments  to the map  are performed.  Both  rc   and  ri  are location  vectors  of the winner  node 
49 (denoted  by subscript c) and i respectively, containing information about a node’s location  within the 
50 map. 
51 
52 wi (t + 1) = wi (t) + hci (t)[x(t) − wi (t)] (5) 
53 
54 
55 The learning function itself is shown in Equation 5. Here the Gaussian  kernel function hci is responsible 
56 for the adjustment of all nodes according  to the input feature  vector x and each node’s distance from 
57 the winning node. This whole adaptation step is the vital part of the SOM algorithm that is responsible 
58 for the algorithm’s self-organisational properties. 
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1 
2 4.3.5 Repetition 
3 
4 Stimulus selection, Response and Adaptation are repeated  a desired number of times or until a map of 
5 sufficient quality is generated. For our experiment this was set to a value suggested by Kohonen  [48]. 
6 He states  that the number  of steps  should  be at  least  500 times  the number  of map  units.  For  this 
7 reason 100,000 epochs were used in our experiments. Another  possible mechanism  for the termination 
8 of the algorithm is the calculation  of the quantization error,  which is the mean  of ||x − wc || over the 
9 training  data.  Once  the overall  quantization  error  falls below a certain  threshold,  the execution  of 
10 the algorithm can stop as an acceptable lower dimensional  representation of the input data  has been 
11 generated. 
12 
13 
14 5 Experimental  Comparison 
15 
16 5.1 Scenarios 
 
18 For  the experiments  in  this  paper,  two  data  sets  are  compiled,  collected  using  a  system  of signal 
19 collection scripts with raw input signal data  collected from the Linux /proc filesystem. One data  set 
20 is termed passive normal  (PN)  and contains a SYN scan performed  without normal  processes invoked 
21 by a user i.e. scan and  shell processes. The  second data  set is termed active normal  (AN).  This  data 
22 set contains an identical SYN scan but is combined  with simultaneous instances of normal  programs 
23 which are used actively by a user throughout the duration of the session i.e. scan, shell processes and 
25 
a firefox web browser. 
26 
Block  scans  are  conducted  across  254 IP  addresses  connecting  to multiple  ports  on  each  host 
27 
successfully probed. Approximately 70 hosts out of the 254 addresses  scanned are available  at any one 
28 
instance during  the scan. For these scenarios, the DCA resides on a client machine which is connected 
29 
to the main network. As the scanned  local hosts are part of a university network and  the availability 
30 
of the hosts is beyond direct control, with the exception of the host on which the DCA monitors. The 
31 
scan performed in both data  sets is a standard SYN scan, with a fast probe sending rate ( <0.1 seconds 
32 
per probe), facilitated through the use of the popular  scanning tool, nmap [17]. The command  invoked 
33 
to perform the SYN scan using nmap  is “nmap -sS -v xxx.xxx.xxx.1-254”. 
34 
The  AN data  set is 7,000 seconds in duration, with ‘normal’ antigen generated  by running  a web 
35 
browser over a separate remote ssh session. During browsing, multiple downloads, chat sessions and the 
36 
receipt  of e-mail occur representing  different  patterns of network  behaviour.  This  actively  generated 
37 
network  traffic  is provided  to observe  if the algorithms  can  differentiate  between  two  highly  active 
38 
processes which run  simultaneously and  modify the networking behaviour  of the victim host. Having 
39 
both  normal  and anomalous  processes running  via the monitored ssh demon may make the detection 
40 
of the scan more difficult. This may increase the MCAV for the normal processes as the DCA relies on 
41 
the temporal correlation  of signals and antigen to perform detection. 
42 
The  PN  data  set  is also 7,000 seconds in duration  and  comprises  of a SYN scan and  its  pseudo- 
43 
terminal  slave (pts) parent process  as anomalous  examples.  The  ssh demon  process  acts  as normal 
44 
antigen and is needed to facilitate the remote login. In addition, a firefox browser runs throughout the 
45 
session, but the system calls are run  locally and  not  through the ssh demon.  Therefore  this does not 
46 
form antigen, but can influence the input signal data.
 
47 
48 
49 5.2 Data  Pre-processing and Signals 
50 
51 The DCA relies on correct mapping of signals, ensured through the examination of preliminary samples 
52 of input data.  For the detection of SYN scans, seven signals are derived from behavioural attributes of 
53 the victim host: two PAMPs,  two danger signals, two safe signals and one inflammatory signal. Having 
54 multiple signals per category  may make the DCA more robust against random  network fluctuations or 
55 conversely could impede classification  through conflicting inputs. 
56 The  PAMP  signals  (PAMP-1 and  PAMP-2) are  both  taken  from data sources  which  indicate  a 
57 scan specifically. Danger signals (DS-1 and DS-2) are derived from attributes which represent changes 
58 in behaviour.  Safe signals (SS-1 and  SS-2) are also derived  from changes  in behaviour,  but high safe 
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1 
2 signal values are shown when the changes are small in magnitude. The inflammatory signal is simplified 
3 to a binary  signal i.e. inflammation present  (1) or not  (0).  All PAMPs,  danger  and  safe signals are 
4 normalised  within a range of zero to 100. A sketch of the input signals throughout the duration of the 
5 two sessions are shown in Figures  7, 8 and 9 for the AN data  set and in Figure  10, 11 and 12 for the 
6 PN data  set. 
7 To  devise a set  of appropriate  signals a number  of preliminary experiments  must  be performed, 
8 in addition  to the acquisition  of knowledge regarding  the effects  of scanning  and  normal  networking 
9 usage within a host. Initially a plethora of system variables are monitored under a variety of situations. 
10 The  signals used in this  experiment  are network  based  attributes. This  kind of system  data  appears 
11 to be the most variable  under  scanning  conditions. Once the candidate signals are selected, they are 
12 then categorised  using the general principles of signal selection i.e. PAMPs  are signature-based, danger 
13 signals are normal  at  low values and  anomalous  at  high values etc. Following the categorisation, the 
14 raw values of signals are transformed into normalised  signals. 
15 PAMP-1 is the number of ICMP ‘destination unreachable’ (DU) error messages received per second. 
16 Scanning IP addresses attached to hosts which are firewalled against ICMP packets generate these error 
17 messages in response to probing. This signal is shown to be useful in detecting ping scans and may also 
18 be important for the detection of SYN scans, as an initial ping scan is performed to find running  hosts. 
19 In this experiment, the number  of ICMP  messages generated  is significantly less than observed with a 
20 ping scan. To account for this, normalisation of this signal includes  multiplying the raw signal value 
21 by five, capped  at a value of 100 (equivalent to 20 DU errors per second). This process is represented 
22 in Equation 6 where raw is the unmodified  system data  and signal  represents the normalised  output 
23 signal. These terms apply  to all equations  described  within this section. 
24 
25 signal  = min{100, raw * 5} (6) 
26 
27 
PAMP-2 is the number  of TCP  reset packets sent and  received per second. Due to the nature of 
28 
the scan, a volume of RST packets are created  in both  port status cases; they are generated  from the 
29 
scanning host if ports are open and are generated  by the remote hosts if ports are closed. RST packets 
30 
are  not  usually  present  in any  considerable  volume,  so their  increased  frequency  is a likely sign of 
31 
scanning activity. This signal is normalised  linearly, with a maximum  cap set at 100 RSTs per second. 
32 
This normalisation process is shown in Equation 7.
 
33 
34 
signal  = min{100, raw} (7)
 
35 DS-1,  the first  danger  signal  is derived  from  the number  of network  packets  sent  per  second. 
36 Previous  experiments  with  this  signal  data  indicate  that it  is useful  for the detection  of outbound 
37 scans  [27]. A different  approach  is taken  for the normalisation of this  signal.  A sigmoid function  is 
38 used to emphasise  the differences in observed rate,  making the range of 100 to 700 packets per second 
39 more sensitive. This sensitive range is determined through preliminary data  analysis of host behaviour 
40 during  scans and  normal  use, with  750 packets  per second found  to be the median  value  across the 
41 plethora of preliminary data.  This  function makes the system less sensitive to fluctuations under  100 
42 packets  per second,  whilst  keeping  the sensitivity  of the higher  values.  A cap is set  at  1500 packets 
43 per second, resulting in a signal range between 0 and 100. The general sigmoid function used for this 
44 transformation is shown in Equation 8, with the specific function shown in Equation 9. 
45 
46 1 f (x) = 
47 1 + e−x 
48 i 1 
(8) 
49 signal  = min{ 
50 
 
1 + 2(7.5− 100  ) 
* 100, 100} (9) 
51 DS-2 is derived from the ratio of TCP  packets to all other packets processed by the network card of 
52 the scanning  host. This may prove useful as during  SYN scans there is a burst of traffic comprised  of 
53 almost entirely TCP  type packets, which is not usually observed under normal conditions. The ratio is 
54 normalised  through multiplication by 100, to give this signal the same range as DS-1. This procedure 
55 is shown in Equation 10. 
56 
57 signal  = 
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Fig. 7  Line  graph  of the PAMP (PAMP-1, PAMP-2) signals  which  constitute  the AN (active  normal) data 
19 set. 
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38 
Fig. 8  Line graph  of the danger  (DS-1, DS-2) signals  which constitute the AN (active normal) data set.
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56 Fig. 9  Line graph  of safe (SS-1, SS-2) signals  which constitute the AN (active normal) data set. 
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Fig. 10  Line graph  of the PAMP (PAMP-1, PAMP-2) signals which constitute the PN (passive normal) data 
19 set. 
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Fig. 11  Line graph  of the danger  (DS-1, DS-2) signals  which constitute the PN  (passive  normal) data set.
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56 Fig. 12  Line graph  of the safe (SS-1, SS-2) signals  which constitute the PN  (passive  normal) data set. 
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Range Signal Value 
40 - 45 0 
46- 50 10 
51- 60 50 
61 + 100 
22 
 
1 
2 Table 3  Ranges  used in the normalisation function of SS-2. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 SS-1 is the rate  of change  of network packet sending  per second. Safe signals are implemented to 
11 counteract the effects of the other signals, hopefully reducing the number of false positive antigen types. 
12 High values of this signal are achieved if the rate is low and vice versa. This implies that a large volume 
13 of packets can be legitimate, as long as the rate  at  which the packets are sent remains  constant. The 
14 value for the rate of change can be calculated  from the raw DS-1 signal value, though conveniently, the 
15 proc file system  also generates  a moving-average  representation  of the rate  of change  of packets  per 
16 second (over 2 seconds). This raw value can be normalised  between values of 10 and 100 and inverted 
17 so that the safe signal value decreases as the raw signal value increases. This normalisation process is 
18 described  in Equation 11. 
19 
20 10 
21 signal  = min{100, max{0, (100 − raw) * 
22 
}} (11) 
9 
23 
SS-2 is based on the observation that during SYN scans the average network packet size reduces to a 
24 
size of 40 bytes, with a low standard deviation.  Preliminary observations under normal conditions show 
25 
that the average  packet  size for normal  traffic  is within  a range  of 70 and  90 bytes.  A step  function 
26 
is implemented  to derive  this  signal  with  transformation  values  presented  in  Table  3. Preliminary 
27 
experiments have also shown that a moving average is needed to increase the sensitivity of this signal. 
28 
This average is created  over a 60 second period. 
29 
The inflammatory signal is binary  and based on the presence of remote  root logins. If a root log-in 
30 
is detected through the monitored ssh demon, this signal is assigned a value of one. When used in the 
31 signal processing  equation,  this  multiplies  the resultant  values of the other  signals by two,  acting  as 
32 
an amplifier for all other  signals including  the safe signal. This  signal may be useful as to perform  a 
33 
SYN scan the invocation  has to come from a user with root privileges. While this is a very important 
34 
feature  of the SYN scan process, it is not suitable for use as a PAMP  signal as it can be easily spoofed. 
35 
Thorough  analysis  of the relationship between  inflammation and  the DCA is outside  of the scope of 
36 
this paper  and  may feature  in future work. While this signal influences the rates  of migration  of the 
37 
DCs,  it  does not  influence the rates  of detection  as the addition  of this  signal  increases  the output 
38 
signal values for both  the semi-mature output (o1 ) and the mature output (o2 ) signals. 
39 
As shown in Figure  7-9 and 10-12, the AN signals are more variable  than the PN signals, as many 
40 more processes run during the AN session. In the AN session, the nmap scan is invoked at 651 seconds. 
41 
Signals PAMP-1,  PAMP-2  and DS-2 clearly change for the duration of the scan. The remaining  signals 
42 
are less clear, though some evidence of changes throughout the scan duration is shown. The  changes 
43 
are transient and localised in particular to the beginning of the scan, when the majority of probes are 
44 
sent to other  hosts. 
45 The signals of the PN data  set are less noisy. Analysis of input antigen confirms nearly 99% of these 
46 antigen belong to the anomalous  pts and nmap  processes. PAMP-1  and PAMP-2  are responsive to the 
47 scan, as shown by their rapid decline towards the end of the scanning period, at 5,500 seconds. Changes 
48 in DS-1 are  more  pronounced  in the PN  data  set,  yet  the magnitude  of this  signal  is smaller  than 
49 expected.  DS-2 appears  to be highly correlated  with  the scan,  yielding values of over 20 throughout 
50 the scan  duration. SS-1 performs  poorly  and  only decreases  in response  to the scan  in a few select 
51 places. SS-2 falls sharply  in the middle of the scan, as predicted, but otherwise  remains  at a constant 
52 
level of 60 even after the scan has finished. 
53 
54 
55 5.3 Antigen 
56 
57 Process  identification numbers  (PIDs)  form the antigen and  are generated  each time a system call is 
58 invoked.  To provide  antigen, all remote  sessions facilitated by ssh are monitored for this experiment. 
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2 Table 4  Summary statistics of the frequency  of system calls for the nmap  and  firefox processes. 
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26 Fig. 13  The  frequency  of system calls invoked  by the nmap  scan process for the AN data set. The trendline 
27 
represents a moving average  over 100 data points. As this figure is presented on a logarithmic scale, the absence 
28 
of points indicates a frequency  of zero system calls for that particular second.
 
29 
30 Using multiple  system  calls with  identical  PIDs  allows for the aggregate  antigen  sampling  method, 
31 having multiple antigen per antigen type. This allows for the detection of active processes when changes 
32 in signal values  are observed.  This  technique  is a form of process anomaly  detection,  but the actual 
33 structure of the PID is not important in terms of its classification, i.e. no pattern matching  is performed, 
34 on the actual value of the PIDs:  it is a label for the purpose  of process identification. 
35 A graph  of the frequency  of system  calls invoked  per  second  for the AN data  set  by  the nmap 
36 process is shown in Figure  13 and for the firefox process in Figure  14. In these two figures, individual 
37 points  represent  the frequency  of system  calls per  second,  while the trendline  represents  a moving 
38 average  over 100 points.  Summary  statistics  of the system  call data  are given in Table  4, which are 
39 generated  across the entire session for both  processes. 
40 The mean/median frequency of system calls for the nmap process is higher than the firefox process. 
41 To assess which process is more variable,  the means are divided by the standard deviations,  as shown 
42 in the summary  table.  This  value  is larger  in the case of nmap  than for firefox. This  indicates  that 
43 relatively,  the standard deviation  of the firefox process is larger in comparison  to the mean than that of 
44 the nmap process. The various proportions of input system calls are represented as a chart in Figure 15 
45 and shows that the nmap  process invokes the majority of system calls in the AN data  set. 
46 
47 
48 
49 5.4 Special Cases for SOM 
50 
51 For use with the SOM both  antigen and signal data  must be correlated  explicitly - this is a feature  of 
52 the DCA that cannot  be translated for use with the SOM. To achieve this coupling, the timestamps of 
53 the signal and  antigen data  are used. Each antigen is assigned the set of signals which occurs within 
54 one second of the antigen generation. This results in what  resembles a standard feature  vector, where 
55 antigens are the data  item ID and signals form seven attributes. In addition to this pairing,  the SOM 
56 requires  training  data,  to assign  nodes  and  to create  the map.  Unlike  the DCA  which  uses expert 
57 knowledge, SOM requires  training data  sets and  therefore ten sets are constructed. Each training set 
58 consists of a diverse number of normal processes which use the networking facility of the host machine. 
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16 Fig. 14  The  frequency  of system  calls invoked  by the firefox web browser  process  for the AN  data  set.  The 
17 trendline represents a moving average  over 100 data points. This  figure is presented on a logarithmic scale and 
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the absence  of points indicates a frequency  of zero system calls for that particular second.
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33 Fig. 15  Proportionate  chart of antigen  per  processes  as  input data for  the active  normal  data  set,  where 
34 FF  Parent is the parent firefox process  and  FF  Child1  and  FF  Child2  are  the forked  children  of  the parent 
35 process. 
36 
37 
38 5.4.1 Training 
39 
40 
Due to the SOM algorithm’s unsupervised  learning nature, training data is required in order to generate 
41 
a map  that is representative  of normal  behaviour.  As described  earlier  this  is not  necessary  for the 
42 
DCA as there is no training stage. A set of ten sessions of normal activity are generated  in an identical 
43 
manner  to the testing  data  except  for the fact  that no antigens  are  generated  as the SOM is only 
44 
trained on signals. Antigen themselves bring no benefit to the SOM in the training stage. Each session 
45 contains approximately 60 minutes worth of data.  The data  contains normal  activity such as internet 
46 
browsing, chatting, file transfer and other  activities performed  by a standard user. 
47 
Once the data  is collected, it is combined into one data  set, which is subsequently used as the input 
48 into  the SOM algorithm.  Input feature  vectors  are  then  selected  from this  data  set  at  random  and 
49 
presented to the map for computation. The training results in a map which can be seen in Figure  16. 
50 
In  this  example,  the brighter  the colour,  the greater  the dissimilarity  of neighbouring  nodes,  with 
51 the map  representing  four clusters.  This  shows one of the maps  that was generated  throughout  our 
52 
experiments. Ten runs were performed,  both  for training and detection. 
53 
54 5.4.2 Detection 
55 
56 The SOM algorithm itself cannot  perform anomaly  detection without any further processing. A mean- 
57 ingful way has to be devised in order  to be able to classify and  make a decision whether a data  item 
58 or a set of items are anomalous.  The  aim of our experiments was to detect whether a whole process 
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25 Fig. 16  An example  map  generated by the original  SOM algorithm. 
26 
27 
28 
is anomalous  or not.  Thus a method for process, rather than signal set anomaly  detection calculation 
29 
had to be developed. 
30 
For informational purposes a simple anomaly detection can be performed on our data  by classifying 
31 sets of signals only. This can be done by firstly using the calculation  in Equation 3, which will determine 
32 
the winning node within our trained map.  We will call this the Best  Matching  Unit (BMU).  Once the 
33 
BMU  is found,  the actual  Euclidean  distance  between  the currently  observed  vector  of signals  and 
34 the BMU is calculated. The  most  trivial  anomaly  detection  is done by choosing a threshold  for this 
35 dissimilarity. If the currently observed item is too different from the BMU, then it is deemed anomalous. 
36 In order to perform process anomaly detection, antigen information has to be correlated  with signals 
37 from the testing  data.  As the SOM is trained  on signals only, antigens  (PIDs)  need to be correctly 
38 correlated  with the right signals in order to be able to link anomalous  sets of signals to their respective 
39 initiators (processes). Initial correlation  is done by synchronizing antigens with signals using timestamp 
40 information. Any antigen with timestamp t is assigned  a signal set at  time t, and  for the purpose  of 
41 synchronisation t is measured  in seconds. Once this synchronisation takes place, the signal set - antigen 
42 coupling is assessed for its anomaly  level using the BMU technique described  previously. 
43 As explained  later  in this  section,  the output antigen  from the DCA  are  ’segmented’  into  fixed 
44 sized sets for analysis.  These ‘antigen segments’ consist of a specified number  of output antigen used 
45 to form the MCAV values.  Multiple MCAV values are produced  as a result of this procedure,  which 
46 may add additional sensitivity. To get a more meaningful  and easily comparable  results to the DCA, a 
47 segmentation post-processing needs to be employed. This is achieved by selecting a segment size z which 
48 generates  the same number  of segments as the DCA. The reason behind  the differing segment sizes is 
49 the way that synchronisation of signal and  antigen is achieved in the SOM experiments compared  to 
50 the way it is achieved by the DCA. The DCA correlates  antigen and signal as part of the algorithm’s 
51 operation  whereas  the signal  and  antigen  need  to be manually  correlated  at  a pre-processing  stage 
52 before analysis using the SOM can occur. In our case z = 1,800; 18,000; 180,000 and 1,800,000. These 
53 segment sizes produce the same number of segments as segment sizes of 100; 1,000; 10,000 and 100,000 
54 respectively, used by the DCA. 
55 Further post-processing is done by using a binary  discrimination of how anomalous  a signal set - 
56 antigen coupling is. It was observed that the median dissimilarity value between an input feature vector 
57 and  the BMU is approximately 65. Thus  this  value  is chosen as the threshold  for deciding  whether 
58 a signal set-antigen coupling should  be deemed anomalous  and  thus assigned  a value of 1 or deemed 
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Name Symbol Value 
Number  of signals  per category 
Number  of signals categories 
Max number  of tissue antigen 
Number  of cells 
Max number  of antigen per DC 
Number  of output signals  per DC 
Number  of DC antigen receptors 
I 
J 
K 
M 
N 
P 
Q 
0 
3 
499 
99 
49 
3 
9 
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1 
2 Table 5  Default  parameter  settings  for the DCA,  chosen  following the sensitivity  analysis  performed previ- 
3 ously [24]. Values  shown indexed  from zero. 
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14 normal and assigned a value of 0. These binary  anomaly  values are then used for the calculation  of the 
15 
mean process anomaly  value. 
16 
Segment  generation   is achieved  by  calculating   the anomaly  value  for  each  signal  set  - antigen 
17 
coupling as described above, followed by further analysis of these results per the various antigen segment 
18 
sizes of z. Thus for z = 1,800, the first 1,800 data  items were processed in the following way. For each 
19 
unique  antigen  a mean  anomaly  value  is calculated  for that given segment.  Once this  calculation  is 
20 
performed,  each segment contains a list of unique antigens with their associated  mean anomaly  value. 
21 
We  call this  the Mean  Best  Matching  Unit  (MBMU)  value.  This  value  gives an  indication  of how 
22 
anomalous  a process is in the given antigen segment. 
23 
24 
25 
5.5 Experiments 
26 
27 Two null hypotheses  are used in these SYN scan experiments: 
28 1.  H1:  modification  of the antigen  segment  size will not  influence the resultant  anomaly  coefficient 
29 values for both  normal  and anomalous  processes 
30 2.  H2:  the DCA and the SOM will produce  results which are not statistically different 
31 
32 Both  the AN and PN data  sets are used in this series. Each data  set is collected using a real-time 
33 version of the DCA, which also provides the opportunity to verify the detection rate  results before an 
34 in-depth analysis  is performed.  Ten runs are performed  for each data  set and the mean MCAV values 
35 / MBMU  values  across  the ten runs  are  recorded.  Unlike  previous  experiments  with  the DCA,  no 
36 system parameters are varied for these experiments. Instead the number of antigen used in the MCAV 
37 calculation  is varied. 
38 For the previous DCA application of ping scan detection, the sessions used are at most one minute 
39 in duration and  generate  approximately 3,000 antigen.  However, the AN and  PN  data  sets  generate 
40 in excess of 100,000 antigen per process therefore analysis  once all data  is processed may not provide 
41 meaningful  results.  Generating the output coefficient  value  at  the end of the 7,000 second session is 
42 too  insensitive  to changes  which happen  over a matter of seconds or minutes.  Figures  are generated 
43 showing the varying  coefficients per process as the session proceeds  and  comparisons  drawn  between 
44 the performance  for the two data  sets. 
45 In terms of assessment, the PIDs with the highest volume of antigen output are used as the processes 
46 of interest. For the passive normal data  set these processes are the nmap scan process and the pts parent 
47 process of the SYN scan.  The  processes of interest  for the active  normal  data  set  include  the nmap 
48 scan, pts process and  the firefox browser.  Graphs  are generated  showing the MCAV and  MBMU for 
49 each process of interest per z antigen presented, for the duration of the experiments for example z=100. 
50 Higher values of MCAV are expected for the SYN scan process and its parent process the ssh demon, 
51 than for the firefox browser.  It is expected that smaller  values of z will yield an improvement in the 
52 precision  and  accuracy  of the detection, though when z = 100, the system may be too sensitive and 
53 an element of tolerance to false positives could be lost. The variants of z for the DCA are presented in 
54 Table  6. 
55 All data  sets are collected and  analyses  with the DCA are performed  on an AMD Athlon 1 GHz 
56 Debian  linux machine  (kernel  2.4.10).  A 2.66 GHz Intel  Core  2 Duo  Ubuntu  linux machine  (kernel 
57 2.6.22)  is used  for  the SOM  processing.  Data  generated   from  the DCA  machine  is used  in  SOM 
58 processing  to avoid  kernel  discrepancies.  The  DCA  is implemented  in C (gcc 4.0.2)  with  the SOM 
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Parameter Global  Ordering Fine-Tuning 
SOM size 
Epoch Limit 
Initial α 
α  decay  scheme 
Neighbourhood size 
Neighbourhood function 
Neighbourhood relation 
10*10 
100,000 
0.9 
Initial α(1 − t/1000) 
5 
Gaussian 
Square 
- 
- 
0.02 
- 
1 
- 
- 
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1 
2 Table 6  The  various  sizes of antigen segment z used for the DCA and  SOM respectively. 
3 
4 
DCA  SOM
 
100 1,800 
5 1,000 18,000 
6 10,000 180,000 
7 100,000 1,800,000 
8 
1,000,000 -
 
9 
10 
11 
Table 7  Weights  used  for  signal  processing,  where  j represents  the input signal  category,  i  represents  an 
instance of a signal within signal category j and  p is the corresponding output signal. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 Table 8  SOM parameters, where  α is the “learning-rate factor” and  t is the current epoch. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
implemented  in C++ (g++ 4.1.3).  All raw  signals  are  derived  using  signal  collection  scripts,  with 
30 values taken from the /proc filesystem (PAMP-1, DS-1, SS-1, I), the tcpstat linux utility (DS-2, SS-2) 
31 
and  a custom  developed  packet  sniffer (PAMP-2). The  system  parameters  used  with  the DCA  are 
32 
shown in Table  5, derived as a result of previous DCA sensitivity analysis [24]. Weights for the signal 
33 processing  of these  data  are shown in Table  7. These  weights  provide  a shorter  time-window  for the 
34 
duration of signal sampling  per DC, shown to be advantageous  for the detection  of ping scans.  The 
35 
migration  threshold  tm   is assigned  a value  of 60 +/− 30 which is the median  signal value  observed 
36 across all signals.  The  parameters  used for the SOM are shown in Table  8 and  are chosen based  on 
37 
recommended  values as proposed  by Kohonen [47]. 
38 
Antigens are generated  using system calls, captured through the use of strace and through manip- 
39 ulation  within the antigen tissue client. The  normalisation of the input signals is implemented using 
40 
the tissue client, antigen processed  using a separate tissue client, with data  processing  and  the DCA 
41 
performed  using  the tissue  server  process.  An  initial  run  of this  system  is performed  to collect  the 
42 input data  and  to check for any potential coding errors.  Input signals and antigens are collected and 
43 
recorded in a logfile using the real-time runs. Analysis of the preliminary real-time results of the output 
44 antigen and  empirical  analysis  of the input data  indicate  its suitability for use in these experiments. 
45 The  libtissue tcreplay client is used to perform  the numerous  runs  of each data  set. It is impor- 
46 tant to stress  that the system  is designed  to work in real-time,  though  tcreplay is used to provide 
47 
reproducibility of results, so a rigorous analysis  can be performed. 
48 
49 
50 5.6 DCA Results 
51 
52 The  results  of the DCA  applied  to the passive  normal  data  are  presented  in Figures  17-19 and  in 
53 Table  9 and  10. The results for an antigen segment size z=100 are shown in Figure  17 and  represent 
54 results  generated  across ten runs  by the DCA  on the same data  set.  High MCAV values  are  shown 
55 upon the initiation of the SYN scan for both  nmap  and  pts processes. The  moving average  trendline 
56 shows three distinct ‘spikes’ which correlate  to the initial sending out of packets by the SYN scan, the 
57 period  of targeted scanning  and  the final stages where network connections are terminated and  scan 
58 results collated  by the nmap  process. 
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16 Fig. 17  PN  results  for the DCA  for nmap  SYN scan  and  pts  processes.  Points  represent  an  average  MCAV 
17 
derived  from  across  the ten runs  performed, where  the size of the antigen  segment  is z=100.  The  trendline 
18 
represents a moving  average  across  50 data points.
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34 Fig. 18  PN  results for the DCA  for nmap  SYN scan  and  pts  processes The  size of the antigen segments (z) 
35 
is 1,000. This  data represents  an  average  MCAV  derived  from  across  the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines 
36 
represent moving  averages  per process of interest across  20 data points.
 
37 
38 Table 9  The  results  for both  active  (AN)  and  passive  (PN) normal  data sets  for the DCA  with  an antigen 
39 
segment size of z = 100,000. Segment 0 includes antigen 0-99,999; segment 1 includes antigen 100,000 to 199,999 
40 
etc.
 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
While the pts process produces  a high MCAV initially, between antigen segments 100 and  900 no 
49 
antigens are presented for the pts process, as it is inactive at  this point. As the trendline is required 
50 
to clarify the results  this  indicates  that a higher  value of z would be preferable  to clearly assess the 
51 
presence of an anomalous  process. 
52 In  Figure  18, the result  of the PN  data  set  are  presented  where  z=1,000.  As with  the results 
53 presented in Figure 17, an initial spike of a high MCAV is shown, implying that the scan is in its initial 
54 stages. While the individual  points on this graph are not as dense as in Figure 17, the additional spikes 
55 representing the latter stages of the scan are less in magnitude, though little difference in the initial 
56 MCAV for the nmap  processes is shown. 
57 The results for z=10,000 are plotted in Figure 19 showing lower values for the pts process and a less 
58 sustained response to the nmap  SYN scan process. Sensitivity is lost when the value of z is increased 
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18 Fig. 19  PN  results for the DCA for all three processes.  Individual points not included  for the sake of clarity. 
19 The size of the antigen segments (z) is 10,000. This  data represents an average  MCAV derived  from across the 
20 ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent moving  averages  per process of interest across  ten data points. 
21 
22 Table 10  The  results for the DCA  for both active (AN)  and  passive  (PN) normal  data sets with an antigen 
23 segment size of z = 1,000,000. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
further as shown in Tables  9 and 10, with the maximum  MCAVs greatly  reduced  from 1.0 in previous 
32 
experiments to 0.19 for the nmap  process.
 
33 
The AN results produced  by the DCA show similar features.  Figure 20 shows the results using the 
34 
smallest  antigen  segment  size of z=100.  In contrast  to the PN  data  set,  the nmap  SYN scan is not 
35 
invoked until antigen segment 500. As shown on this graph,  following the initiation of this scan, the 
36 
MCAV of all three processes of interest (nmap,  pts, firefox) are shown to increase. 
37 
These  increases  in MCAV  form four spikes throughout  the session duration. The  density  of the 
38 
datapoints  in this  graph  makes  the correct  interpretation  of this  graph  somewhat  difficult.  This  is 
39 
improved  with the addition of a trendline, generated  through applying  a moving average  of 50 points 
40 
across the data.  During  the scan period,  the DCA presents  antigen,  irrespective  of its  source, in the 
41 
mature context, as shown through the generation  of high MCAV values for both  the nmap  SYN scan 
42 
and firefox browser processes. This implies that the generation  of false positives occurs when a normal 
43 
and anomalous  process run simultaneously through the monitored ssh demon. 
44 The  results  for antigen  segments  0 to 500 are shown in Figure  21 for the sake of clarity.  During 
45 this  period  the majority  of antigen  presented  belong to the firefox process  and  some modulation of 
46 the behaviour  of the monitored system occurs, as seen in the initial 500 seconds of Figure  20. Despite 
47 these activities, the MCAVs presented in Figure  21 are all relatively  low. This suggests that the DCA 
48 using these  particular  signals responds  appropriately to normal  processes in the absence  of scanning 
49 activity. 
50 In  Figure  22, the results  are  presented  for  the AN  data  set  where  z=1,000.  In  comparison  to 
51 Figure 20, the trendlines of the graph are observably  similar. Figure 23 shows that an antigen segment 
52 size of z=10,000 produces  observably  different results to z=1,000. This  is evident as the major  spike 
53 peak  evident  in Figure  20 and  22 is missing in Figure  23. Additionally,  the only process technically 
54 classed as ‘anomalous’ (MCAV above 0.5, chosen to reflect the proportion of nmap antigen in the input 
55 data) is the nmap  scan, though only briefly. This implies that the larger size of z increases the rate  of 
56 false negatives  as shown through the lower values in Figure 23 and also shown in Tables  9 and 10. For 
57 experiments where z = 100,000 and z=1,000,000, the MCAVs are also reduced. However, an interesting 
58 effect is that there is a greater  difference in the MCAVs of the normal  and anomalous  processes. 
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16 Fig. 20  AN results for the DCA  for nmap  SYN scan  and  pts  processes.  Points represent  an  average MCAV 
17 derived  from  across  the ten runs  performed, where  the size of the antigen  segment  is z=100.  The  trendline 
18 represents a moving  average  across  50 data points. 
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36 Fig. 21  AN  results  for initial  500 antigen  segments  produced  with  the DCA  to highlight  the  low  MCAVs 
37 yielded.  Points represent an average  MCAV  derived  from across  the ten runs  performed,  where  z = 100. The 
38 
trendline represents a moving  average  across  20 data points.
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40 
41 
An example  of this is evident in antigen segment zero presented in Table  9, where the MCAV for 
42 
the nmap  scan is three  times  the magnitude  of the MCAV of the firefox process.  If the threshold  of 
43 
anomaly  is applied at a level of 0.1, this experiment would yield results which detected the nmap  SYN 
44 
scan as anomalous  and  the firefox process as ‘normal’. Other examples  of this are also shown for the 
45 
AN data  set  in Table  10. This  implies that while larger  values  of z can produce  false negatives,  the 
46 
potential for the reduction of false positives is also evident.
 
47 
48 
49 5.7  SOM Results 
50 
51 The  PN  results  for the SOM are  presented  in Figures  24-26. As with  the results  of the DCA,  high 
52 coefficient values are generated  initially for both  nmap  and  pts processes. A further ‘spike’ is evident 
53 at  segment  numbers  1,000-1,200 of Figure  24. These  trends  are  also evident  in Figures  25 and  26. 
54 Trendlines  are  added  to each graph  to represent  a moving  average  per  process.  At the lowest  level 
55 of granularity  of z=1,800  (equivalent  in the number  of segments  to DCA z=100),  it  is unclear  as to 
56 exactly what  the individual  data  points imply. Therefore  a larger size of segment may be required,  as 
57 also found with  the DCA.  Again,  sensitivity  is lost  as the size of z is large,  as shown by the results 
58 presented in Table  11 where z is 1,800,000. 
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16 Fig. 22  AN results  for all three  processes  produced  with  the DCA.  The  size of the antigen  segments  (z)  is 
17 1,000.  This  data represents  an  average  MCAV  derived  from  across  the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines 
18 represent moving  averages  per process of interest across  ten data points. 
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Fig. 23  AN results  for all three  processes.  Individual points  not  included  for the sake  of clarity.  The  size of 
the antigen  segments  (z)  is 10,000. This  data represents  an  average  MCAV  derived  from  across  the  ten runs 
41 performed. The  trendlines represent moving  averages  per process of interest across  ten data points. 
42 
43 
44 
45 In a similar  manner,  the AN results for the SOM produce  initially high coefficients for the nmap 
46 process.  The  results  for z=1,800  are  presented  in Figure  27. This  shows a major  spike at  the point 
47 of the scan  commencement  (segments  400-700). Unlike the DCA  upon application of a trendline,  it 
48 appears  that the response  to the scan  is not  sustained  as  three  peaks  are  evident,  as  opposed  to 
49 the single peak  shown with  the DCA.  Also, the SOM produces  high coefficient  values for the firefox 
50 process, suggesting that discrimination between active anomalous  and active normal processes can not 
51 be completely achieved by either algorithm. 
52 
53 The  graphs  produced  for z=18,000  and  180,000 are shown in Figures  28 and  29 respectively.  As 
54 with  the PN  results,  the response  to the nmap  decreases  as the value of z increases.  This  is evident 
55 from  both  graphs  and  in Table  11. Unlike  the DCA,  which  produced  MCAVs  for nmap  which  are 
56 consistently  higher  than with  firefox (Figure  23), with  the SOM results  both  the nmap  and  firefox 
57 coefficients decrease at  a similar  rate,  as exemplified in Figure  29. Statistical analysis  is presented to 
58 verify these observations in the next section. 
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18 Fig. 24  PN  results for all three processes using the SOM. The  size of the output segments (z) is 1,800. This 
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data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs performed. The trendlines represent moving 
20 
averages  per process of interest across  50 data points.
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37 Fig. 25  PN  results  for  all  three  processes  using  the SOM.  The  size of the output segments  (z)  is  18,000. 
38 This  data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent 
39 moving  averages  per process of interest across  20 data points. 
40 
41 Table 11  The  results for both active (AN)  and  passive  (PN) normal  data sets for the SOM with a segment 
42 size of z = 1,800,000. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 6 Discussion: Analysis and Comparison 
53 
54 6.1 Null Hypothesis  H1: Antigen segments 
55 
56 Performance of Mann-Whitney tests (an unpaired  rank-based statistical test for non-parametric data [31]) 
57 comparing  the results are presented in Figure  20 with the other  antigen segment sizes. The results of 
58 this analysis are shown in Table 12, which assesses the rejection of null hypothesis  H1. As indicated, in 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
M
B
M
U
 C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
M
B
M
U
 C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
4
6
15
 
 
1 
2 
3 
1.0 
 
5 
0.8 
 
7 
0.6 
8 
9 
0.4 
10 
11 
0.2 
12 
13 0.0 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
● 
 
● 
● 
●                  ●     ●       ●     ● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
●                  ● ●       ● 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
●                  ●       ●       
●       ● 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nmap 
●                    Pts 
−         Nmap MA 
−    Pts MA 
5 10 15 20 25 
 
16 
Antigen   Segment Number
 
17 
18 Fig. 26  PN  results  for all  three  processes  using  the SOM.  The  size of the output segments  (z)  is  180,000. 
19 
This  data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent 
20 
moving  averages  per process of interest across  ten data points.
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37 Fig. 27  AN  results  for  all  three  processes  using  the SOM.  The  size  of the output segments  (z)  is 1,800. 
38 This  data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent 
39 moving  averages  per process of interest across  50 data points. 
40 
41 
42 
three out of the four tested cases, the data  series are significantly different. This indicates  that z does 
43 
have an influence on the results of the DCA. Some further work with this concept may prove fruitful, 
44 
especially if dynamic  antigen segment sizes are used, linked to process activity. The demonstration of 
45 
statistical significance implies that null hypothesis  H1 can be rejected. 
46 
As the data  is not  normally  distributed  for either  algorithm,  Mann-Whitney  tests  are performed 
47 
on the results of the SOM, comparing  the results of z=1,800 with all other  results for the AN nmap 
48 
process. The resultant p-values are presented in Table  13. These results show that the modification  of 
49 
z produces  a statistically significant effect on the resultant anomaly  values. Therefore,  null hypothesis 
50 
H1 is also rejected for the SOM in addition to its rejection produced  by the DCA. 
51 
52 
53 6.2 Null Hypothesis  H2: Head to Head Comparison 
54 
55 To assess H2, the results produced  by the DCA and  SOM are compared  statistically for one selected 
56 antigen  segment  size. For  this  purpose  DCA  z=1,000  and  SOM z=18,000  are  used  as they  contain 
57 approximately a similar number of segments for both nmap and firefox. As these data  are not normally 
58 distributed (confirmed by the application of the Shapiro-Wilk  test) and do not form exact pairs, a one- 
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18 Fig. 28  AN  results  for all  three  processes  using  the SOM.  The  size of the output segments  (z)  is  18,000. 
19 
This  data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent 
20 
moving  averages  per process of interest across  20 data points.
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37 Fig. 29  AN  results  for all  three  processes  using  the SOM.  The  size of the output segments  (z)  is  180,000. 
38 This  data represents an average  MBMU derived  from across the ten runs  performed. The  trendlines represent 
39 moving  averages  per process of interest across  ten data points. 
40 
41 Table 12  The  results  of the Mann-Whitney  test comparing the results  of z=100  to the results  of  z=1,000, 
42 
z=10,000  and  z=100,000.  A confidence  interval  of 95 % is used  and  data which  are  statistically  significantly 
43 
different are marked  with an asterisk.
 
44 
z p-value 
45 
1,000 <0.0001* 
10,000 0.358 
46 100,000 < 0.0001* 
47 
48 
49 
50 sided unpaired  Mann-Whitney test is used to perform this comparison.  As the sample size is in excess 
51 of 300 datapoints, a 99% confidence interval is deemed appropriate for this assessment. 
52 The  results  of this  comparison  for the firefox process yields a p-value  of 0.02, which at  the given 
53 confidence interval  implies  that the two  sets  of results  are  not  statistically  significant.  This  implies 
54 that the algorithms  produce  similar  results  for active  normal  processes.  For  the firefox process,  null 
55 hypothesis  H2 cannot  be rejected under  these particular circumstances with these given data  sets. 
56 Upon  performance  of the same  statistical  test, the nmap  process  produces  a  p-value  of 0.002, 
57 which shows that the two algorithms produce statistically significant differences in the detection of the 
58 scan process. To assess which system produces  the better performance,  an additional two-sided Mann- 
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24
35 
 
1 
2 Table 13  The  results  of the Mann-Whitney  test comparing the SOM  results  of z=1,800  to the  results  of 
3 z=18,000, z=180,000 and  z=1,800,000. A confidence  interval of 95 % is used  and  data which  are statistically 
4 significantly different are marked  with an asterisk. 
5 z p-value 
6 18,000 <0.0001* 
7 180,000 < 0.0001* 
8 
1,800,000 < 0.0001*
 
9 
10 
11 Whitney  is performed.  The  results  of this  test show that the DCA  has  the improved  performance, 
12 producing  a p-value of 0.0001. Therefore  null hypothesis  H2 can be rejected for the nmap  process and 
13 that the DCA shows the better performance  on this occasion. 
14 
15 
16 6.3 Baseline 
17 
18 To validate  both  sets  of results  and  to ensure  that both  performances  are improved  over a baseline, 
19 a k-means classifier is applied  to the signal data.  The classifier used belongs to the WEKA  suite [65]. 
20 In this test 52% of the signals were classed as belonging to one class while 48% to another class. This 
21 implies  that the necessary  discrimination cannot  be achieved  through  classification  on the basis  of 
22 signals  alone.  This  also shows that this  data  is non-trivial  to classify and  adds  value  to the results 
23 produced  for both  the SOM and DCA. 
 
25 
26 
27 
6.4 Conjecture
 
28 
29 
We have  validated the use of the DCA  as a serious  competitor  for anomaly  detection  applications. 
30 
Until this comparison  we were still uncertain as to the quality of results produced  by the DCA. This 
31 
comparison with the traditional SOM has shown that the DCA shows great promise as a successful AIS 
32 
algorithm. The performance  produced  by the DCA shows that the algorithm is capable  of performing 
33 
at a level comparable  to a standard technique. 
34 
It is interesting that the results for the firefox process are not  statistically different for both  algo- 
35 
rithms,  yet  differences are  evident  for the nmap  process.  This  may  be attributed to the method  by 
36 
which the signals are processed.  In the DCA, signals are assigned weights on a per-category basis. In 
37 
the SOM, all signals carry equal weight. Perhaps the fact that the DCA uses heavy weighting for both 
38 
PAMP  and danger  signals is responsible  for the improved  rate  of nmap  detection. 
39 
Alternatively, the correlation  between antigen and signal occurs within the DCA but is performed 
40 
explicitly during the normalisation stage with the SOM. This activity-dependent association  produced 
41 
by the DCA may mean that for the duration of the scan, the coupling between the signals and antigen 
42 
for the nmap  process is tighter. This could be due to the fact that the amount of processed antigen is 
43 
increased.  As noted  by Oates  et al [57] the increased DC migration  rate  may result in greater  volumes 
44 
of processed antigen. This may result in a tighter coupling between antigen and signals during periods 
45 of high  activity  and  high  signal  levels. A theoretical  analysis,  outside  of the scope of this  paper,  is 
46 
necessary  to confirm the coupling mechanism  and  may provide  insight as to the cause and  nature of 
47 
this effect plus the further reaching consequences of applicability of the DCA. 
48 
49 
50 7 Conclusions 
51 
52 In this paper  we have compared  two biologically inspired  algorithms, the immune-inspired DCA and 
53 the neurological-inspired SOM when applied  to the detection  of a SYN port scan.  Two constructed 
54 data  sets are produced  for this purpose  consisting of 13 million data  items to classify. Each algorithm 
55 was successful at performing  anomaly  detection, with the number  of antigen, z, used per classification 
56 step varied. It is shown that both algorithms are sensitive to changes in z. A direct comparison between 
57 the SOM and DCA is provided. For the normal processes, both algorithms performed equally well, with 
58 the DCA  producing  a significantly  improved  performance  at  detecting  the anomalous  process.  As a 
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11
31
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41
36 
 
1 
2 result, the DCA is shown to be a competitive anomaly  detection algorithm. As further work, the DCA 
3 will be applied experimentally to other large data  sets, including further benchmarking with computer 
4 security  data  and  applications potentially  including  large-scale  data  which requires  correlation, such 
5 as data  derived  from radio  telescopes.  In  addition  a theoretical  analysis  of the DCA  is required  to 
6 fully understand the nature of this relatively  novel algorithm and to be able to assess future successful 
7 applications. 
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